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I. Introduction
Digital technology and global networks have led to the so-called
digital dilemma.' On the one hand, digital technology and the
Internet facilitate the global dissemination of information at very low
cost. This feature favors static efficiency in the use of existing works
because works as public goods are distributed as widely as is
economically feasible. On the other hand, digital technology and
global networks diminish the control copyright owners have over
1. See COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA (2000); CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (CBO), COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN
DIGITAL MEDIA (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?
index=5738&sequence=0; WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP 11-37 (2004);
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U CHI. L. REV. 263, 270-276 (2002). The literature
on the economics of intellectual property, especially on copyright in the digital age, cannot
be accounted for completely. See generally Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84
HARV. L. REV. 281, 313 (1970); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 335 (1989); PETER DRAHOS, A
PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 119 et seq. (1996); Julie Cohen, Copyright
and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1812 (2000); James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or
Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2013 (2000); R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free:
Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003);
Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law,
U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 204, at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=529943 (Apr. 2004); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Justifications for Intellectual Property, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 144,
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=494424 (Feb. 2004).
their copyrighted works. If one single digital copy made available on
the Internet, especially in a peer-to-peer (p2p) network, theoretically
suffices as a master for an indefinite number of identical,
unauthorized clones, right holders fear that they will not be able to
recoup their investment in producing the work in the first place.
Without this promise, it is argued, fewer works will be created.
Beneficial dynamic effects of intellectual property protection will be
lost. It is thus not surprising that copyright owners try to condition
access to information on the basis of digital-rights management
(DRM) systems. These measures rely on digitization and therefore on
the very same technology that makes widespread dissemination of
information possible. From its very beginning, copyright has had to
cope with, and has addressed,2 the tension between the public interest
in increasing the storehouse of knowledge and the author's interest in
obtaining compensation to secure his investment. Digitization and the
Internet carry this tension to extremes because they optimize both
static and dynamic efficiency.
The current paradigm of this dilemma is p2p file sharing.' Peer-
to-peer technology is a broad term used to describe the architecture
of computers in a system. A p2p network is characterized by the
content being served not by a single central server, but by equal, or
"peer," machines linked across the network to communicate with
each other. No one computer contains all of the information that is
available to all of the users. Rather, each computer makes
information available to every other computer in the p2p network,
being both a server and a client.' The architecture of those networks
changes rapidly. Whereas systems like Napster relied on centralized
indexing systems, maintaining a list of available files on one or more
central servers,5 systems like Gnutella 6 or KaZaA have become more
2. The search for a balance in copyright is already inherently articulated in U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8: "To promote the Progress of Science ... by securing for limited
Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings ......
3. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 296 (2004); Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), Information Technology Outlook 2004: Peer to
Peer Networks in OECD Countries 2 (2004), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
55/57/32927686.pdf; Michael A. Einhorn & Bill Rosenblatt, Peer-to-Peer Networking and
Digital Rights Management: How Market Tolls Can Solve Copyright Problems, 52 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 239, 255 (2005) (discussing the benefits and harms of p 2 p
networks).
4. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770 (2005); MGM Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004); Aric Jacover, I Want My MP3!
Creating a Legal and Practical Scheme to Combat Copyright Infringement on Peer-to-Peer
Internet Applications, 90 GEO. L.J. 2207, 2213-18 (2002).
5. See A&M Recording, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2001);
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decentralized. Users install software that enables them to "share"
content located on their computers directly with other users. The
software connects them to the p2p network and makes any shared
files available for search and transfer to any other user currently
connected to the same p2p network.7 Two different methods of
indexing the files available for sharing can be distinguished. The
Gnutella software system is a completely decentralized indexing
system in which each computer maintains a list of files available on
that computer only. The software broadcasts a search request to all
the computers on the network and a search of the respective index
files is conducted. The collective results are routed back to the
requesting computer.8 Under the "supernode" model, which was
developed by KaZaA BY, a Dutch company, and licensed under the
name of "FastTrack" technology, a number of select computers on
the network are designated as indexing servers which conduct the
search and supply the user with the search results. As long as it meets
the technical requirements, any computer on the network can
function as a supernode. 9
Peer-to-peer networks provide architecture for stable, cheap, and
global sharing of any digitized information, be it music, movies,
software, writings or other data. The end-to-end or peer-to-peer
architecture makes it possible for thousands of terabytes to rush
through p2p networks every month without anybody having to invest
in and provide for a centralized server.0 The technology features
characteristics that prompt great hopes for the advent of the global
knowledge community. But it also terrifies copyright owners that
stand to lose control over their works, which for the users of these
Jacover, supra note 4, at 2214.
6. See Jacover, supra note 4, at 2216 (providing a description of the Gnutella p2p
architecture).
7. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2771 (2005); Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029,1032-33 (C.D. Cal. 2003);
Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet, 351 F.3d 1229, 1231-
32 (C.A.D.C. 2003); SVEN FREIWALD, DIE PRIVATE VERVIELFALTIGUNG IM DIGITALEN
KONTEXT AM BEISPIEL DES FILESHARING 126-142 (2004) (discussing German copyright
law).
8. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2771 (2005).
9. Id.
10. See id. at 2770; Jeff Howe, Streaming Media, Wired Magazine, June 2004, at 148-
149, available at http://all12.g.akamai.net/7/1112/492/07312000/www.wired.com/wired/
archive/12.061imagesatlas-media.pdf (according to this study on the growth of p2p
networks over the last two years. music accounted for 80.4%, video for 16.4 %, images for
1.9%, and software for 1.2% in March 2003-in March 2004, these numbers had changed
significantly to 57.4% music files, 31.9% video files, 7.3% images and 3.2% software); see
also OECD, supra note 3, at 3-8.
networks actually seem to be "free as the air to common use." The
conflict that arose out of this technological development has already
been called a "war."" It is taking place between copyright owners-
especially the music industry, the branch of the entertainment
industry that has been most severely struck by the rise of p2p
networks' 2-and users and their proponents, who want to retain the
benefits of this technology for themselves and for society at large.
This dispute is far from being resolved. Aside from court
proceedings regarding the liability of users and mere facilitators of
file sharing for copyright infringement, different proposals for future
amendments of the respective laws have been made. In particular,
several commentators and institutions suggest a solution where non-
commercial file sharing in p2p networks would be lawful and the
copyright owner would be compensated indirectly through a
collective licensing scheme, tax or levy.3
This article addresses whether these last mentioned proposals
are in accordance with obligations under the Berne Convention
(BC),'4 the TRIPS Agreement'5 and the WCT. 6 This question is not
only of theoretical relevance; the U.S. has ratified all three treaties.
Overall, 157 countries are party to the Berne Convention, 7 148 to the
WTO and thus the TRIPS Agreement, 8 and 50 to the WCT 9 Given
that countries adhere to their obligations under this "supranational
copyright law,"2° every proposal that has a chance of being enacted
11. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 10; Lessig, supra note 3, at 10; Fisher, supra note 1, at
82; Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Towards a Liability Regime for File-
Sharing, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 40 (2004).
12. While the use of p2p networks has grown, revenues of the U.S. music industry fell
4 percent in 2001, 8 percent in 2002, and 6 percent in 2003. See CBO, supra note 1, at 17.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act of
July 24, 1971, as amended on September 28, 1979, available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/woOOlen.htm.
15. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of April 15,
1994, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf.
16. WIPO Copyright Treaty and Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO
Copyright Treaty, adopted in Geneva on December 20, 1996, available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/woO33en.htm.
17. See Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/index.html (last visited January 12, 2005).
18. See The WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/thewto-e.htm (last visited
January 12, 2005).
19. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdfls-
wct.pdf (last visited January 12, 2005).
20. See Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The
Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 33 (2005); Jane C. Ginsburg,
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has to be tested for compliance with these requirements under
international law. The German Ministry of Justice already declined to
adopt a new limitation on copyright with regard to non-commercial
file sharing, explicitly referring to the three-step test under Berne.
Additionally, the dispute settlement system of the GATTIWTO for
the first time makes it possible to enforce rules of an international
treaty on intellectual property. When one country adopts a trade
policy measure or takes some action that one or more fellow WTO
members considers a violation of the WTO agreements, including
TRIPS,23 a dispute settlement procedure can be instituted. According
to the Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), the Dispute Settlement
Body may authorize the imposition of trade sanctions if the target of
the complaint does not follow the recommendations of the panel
report or the appeals report.24 As of October 2005, the WTO
homepage lists 24 dispute settlement procedures relating to TRIPS.25
One of the procedures concerned U.S. copyright law. The WTO
Panel held that 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) poses a violation of the obligations
Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the "Three-step
Test" for Copyright Exceptions, 187 Revue Internationale du Droit d'Auteur (RIDA) 3
(2001); but see Pierre Sirinelli, Workshop on Implementation Issues of the WIPO Copyright
Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phoograms Treaty (WPPT): Exceptions
and Limits to Copyright and Neighbouring Rights 42 (Dec. 3, 1999),
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/1999/wct-wppt/pdfimp991.pdf (stating that
the three-step test "is far from providing harmonization"). According to the case-law of
the European Court of Justice, when called upon to apply national rules with a view to
ordering measures for the protection of rights in a field to which the TRIPS Agreement
applies and in which the Community has already legislated, the national courts are
required under Community law to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and
purpose of the relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. See ECJ, Anheuser-Busch
Inc. v. Budejovicky Budvar, ndrodni podnik, C-245/02, 04/11/16, at para. 55.
21. See Bill for a "Second Act on Copyright in the Information Society" of
September 27, 2004 33-34 (2004), http://www.bmj.bund.de/files/
630f712008607f2bf49cde66e5a84046/760/ReferentenentwurfUrheberR.pdf, 33-34
(German).
22. In a WTO Dispute Settlement Proceeding, the one invoking the restriction to
minimum rights under TRIPS bears the burden of proof. See Panel Report, United States-
Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, WT/DS160 (June 15, 2000), para. 6.9-16; Panel
Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/13 (March 17,
2000), para. 7.16.
23. See Art. 64 TRIPS.
24. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1226
(1994).
25. See Index of Dispute Issues, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/
dispu-subjects-indexe.htm#bkmkl37 (last visited October 5, 2005).
2PI
of the U.S. under the TRIPS Agreement.26 As a result and as a
temporary arrangement between the U.S. and the EC, the U.S.
agreed to make a lump-sum payment in the amount of $3.3 million to
a fund to be set up by performing rights societies in the European
Communities for the provision of general assistance to their members
and the promotion of authors' rights for a three-year period
commencing on December 21, 2001.7 Thus, an amendment of
national copyright law that is in violation of TRIPS may actually have
to be abandoned to avoid trade sanctions by other WTO members.
It is therefore true that international copyright law has to be
considered in the discussion about the future of copyright in the
digital network environment. If a proposal does not comport with
treaty obligations, it would be necessary to either amend respective
international rules or to terminate membership, which would in the
case of the TRIPS Agreement mean leaving the WTO. Obviously,
these alternatives are not likely to become reality. The amendment of
an international treaty requires international consensus of all
contracting parties. 8 Terminating membership in the WTO will not
be taken as a serious option in a global economy by any country.
Nevertheless, the discussion about the digital dilemma, especially
in the U.S., focuses on the-admittedly central-search for an
effective, preferably balanced solution. Models are developed for the
future. Current law is not the yardstick. Obligations under
international copyright law are merely considered in detail.29
Admittedly, proposals that start from scratch are essential to fuel the
discussion and to finally come to an acceptable solution for all players
involved. The aim of this article, in contrast, is to contribute to this
discussion by adopting a strictly positivistic view. This will help to
outline a model of future copyright in the digital online environment
that has not yet been clearly articulated, i.e., what I call the bipolar
copyright system. This system acts on the proposals already on the
26. See Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, supra note
22.
27. See Notification of a Mutually Satisfaction Temporary Agreement, United States-
Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/23 (June 26, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/casese/ds60_e.htm.
28. On the difficulties to amend the TRIPS Agreement, see Gervais, supra note 20, at
28 ("far from simple politically"); Gervais, supra note 11, at 71 ("any proposal to license
P2P should take account of applicable international treaties"); Peter Eckersley, Virtual
Markets for Virtual Goods: The Mirror Image of Digital Copyright?, 18 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 85, 157 (2004).
29. See infra Part IV.
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table. However, it additionally claims to be in line with international
copyright law and thus actually available for national legislatures.
Part II of this article gives a short overview of how copyright has
been applied to p2p file sharing and how different stakeholders and
academic commentators reacted to this new technology. Part III
shows that many national copyright laws, including U.S. law, have for
a long time provided statutory or compulsory licenses with regard to
certain uses of copyrighted content. Part III also summarizes
proposals pleading for the implementation of a levy or tax system for
non-commercial file sharing. Discussion of the pros and cons of this
approach reveals that economic analysis will not provide us with an
answer to where exactly the best level of protection of works in the
digital online environment lies. It thus seems reasonable to refer to
the existing body of international copyright law in order to ask how
far a national legislature may go in establishing limitations to or
exceptions from the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, and in
subjecting the privileged uses to a levy or tax. For these purposes,
part IV contains a detailed interpretation of relevant rules of the BC,
TRIPS, and the WCT with regard to the concepts mentioned. Specific
attention will be given to the three-step test, as it is a part of all of
these conventions, and to the provisions of the WIPO copyright
treaties on the legal protection of technological protection measures.
This analysis will reveal that all international treaties on copyright are
based on the notion that copyright is an exclusive right of the author.
Limitations and exceptions are admissible only to a very limited
extent. Even if a levy or tax system compensates for the privileged
uses, it arguably cuts across the boundaries of the three-step test,
unless it is the right holder who decides whether her work should be
made available for unrestricted non-commercial use in p2p networks
under the levy/tax system. This freedom to choose between
technology-based exclusivity in cyberspace on the one hand and
participation in a levy/tax system that allows non-commercial file
sharing in exchange for an indirect compensation of the right holder
on the other hand is the core feature of the bipolar copyright system.
Part V will discuss this system in further detail. Part VI concludes
with an emphasis on what this study tells us about the flexibility of
international copyright law in general.
II. Copyright and Peer-to-Peer Networks
The advent of p2p network technology and the ability of users all
over the world to exchange digital files intensified the conflict
between right holders and users about the future of copyright in
cyberspace. Much is at stake for both sides. Copyright owners fear
not being able to establish a market for digital products. Users want
to benefit from cheap, worldwide, and unrestricted access to
information contained in published works. In this dispute, not even
the facts are uncontroversial."
A. Applying Today's Copyright Law to P2P File Sharing
The legal questions surrounding file sharing are only slowly
being cleared up by court decisions in various jurisdictions. Right
holders have applied several strategies to pursue their goal of
minimizing unauthorized sharing of copyrighted content. Since the
abandonment of p2p technology would be the most effective way to
fight unauthorized file sharing, copyright owners have often sued
providers of p2p file sharing services or suppliers of p2p file sharing
software for indirect copyright infringement.
This approach proved successful with regard to centralized
networks like Napster.3' It initially failed concerning software
providers for decentralized systems.32 In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v.
Grokster, however, the Supreme Court held that,
30. It is not undisputed, on an empirical level, whether if at all, and if so, to what
extent, file sharing causes declines in sales of music and other copyrighted products. See
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2794 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring);
OECD, supra note 3, at 4; Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File
Sharing on Record Sales. An Empirical Analysis 24-25 (March 2004),
http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers[FileSharing-March2004.pdf (concluding that file sharing
has no statistically significant effect on purchases of the average music album and that file
sharing probably increases aggregate welfare due to increased dissemination of music);
Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, The Effect of Internet Piracy on CD Sales: Cross-
Section Evidence, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1122 (Jan. 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=511763; Stan J. Liebowitz, Pitfalls in Measuring the Impact of File-
Sharing, 51 CESifo Economic Studies 435, 471-472 (2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=583484 (surveying the literature on the impact of file sharing and
concluding that the evidence to date strongly suggests that file sharing harms the sound
recording industry). Moreover, a study on the effects of downloading on welfare as well as
expenditure in a subsample of Penn undergraduates argues that downloading reduces the
per capita expenditure of the undergraduates (on hit albums released 1999-2003) from
$126 to $100 but raises per capita consumer welfare by $70. See Rafael Rob & Joel
Waldfogel, Piracy on the High C's: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social
Welfare in a Sample of College Students, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper
10874 (Oct. 2004), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/W10874.
31. See A&M Recording, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); In re
Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
32. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004); MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Jacover, supra note
4, at 2227-45; Judica Krikke, Comment: Dutch Supreme Court, Collecting Society
Buma/Stemra v. KazaA B.V., 2004 COMPUTER L. REV. INT'L (CRi) 90-91; Freiwald, supra
note 7, at 157-165; Michael Napthali, Unauthorised: Some Thoughts Upon the Doctrine of
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[o]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting
its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, going
beyond mere distribution with knowledge of third-party
action, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by
third parties using the device .... ."
Considering the context of the entire record, the Supreme Court
found that the required "unlawful objective" of defendants Grokster
and StreamCast-providers of software for decentralized p2p
networks-was "unmistakable." 34 Therefore, the Court held the
defendants liable for the "gigantic" direct infringement of the
recipients of the software." In reaching this result, the Supreme Court
declared that the Ninth Circuit's judgment in favor of the defendants
rested on an erroneous reading of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Instead of interpreting this
case as one involving liability based on presuming or imputing intent
to cause infringement solely from the design or distribution of a
product capable of substantial lawful use, which the distributor knows
is in fact used for infringement, the Ninth Circuit interpreted this case
as one involving liability on any theory. Where evidence-as in this
case-would go beyond a product's characteristics or the knowledge
that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions
directed to promoting infringement, Sony's staple-article rule would
not preclude liability.36 The Court distinguished Sony, which dealt
with a claim of liability based solely on distributing a product with
alternative lawful and unlawful uses, with knowledge that some users
would follow the unlawful course, from this case and did not revisit
Sony further to add a more quantified description of the point of
balance between copyright protection and free commerce when
liability rests solely on the distribution with knowledge that unlawful
use of the product will occur.37 Therefore, the court did not decide
about whether the mere distribution of software designed for
decentralized p2p networks as such is enough to establish indirect
copyright infringement. Obviously, the court was divided on that
Authorisation of Copyright Infringement in the Peer-to-Peer Age, 16 Australian Intellectual
Property Journal (AIPJ) 5 (2005).
33. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2767 (2005).
34. Id. at 2782.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2776-2780.
37. Id. at 2778.
matter. Two concurring opinions take up the Sony question: whether
Grokster's product is "capable of substantial or commercially
significant noninfringing uses." Three judges answered this question
in the affirmative, but three other judges disagreed." Ultimately, the
Grokster decision does not clearly define the relationship between
copyright and decentralized p2p networks. In any event, it could have
done so only as regards U.S. copyright law. Apparently, no
jurisdiction has yet taken a final position on this matter. Thinking
about alternatives to the current legal situation in light of the
boundaries of international copyright thus remains a current and
important topic-more than ever after Grokster.
The limited success that litigants have had suing distributors of
p2p file sharing software has shifted the focus of the debate to finding
ways for copyright owners to receive compensation from those who
actually use p2p networks.39 Only six days after the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v.
Grokster, the Department of Justice announced the first criminal
enforcement action against "an extensive peer-to-peer network
suspected of enabling users to traffic illegally in music, films, software
and published works." 4 The ones who actually use works are the
uploaders and downloaders of copyrighted content. It seems to be
settled that according to Art. 8 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT),
making works available on the Internet ("uploading") infringes
copyright if not permitted by the respective right holder.41 It is less
38. Three judges found that "fairly appraised, the evidence was insufficient to
demonstrate, beyond genuine debate, reasonable prospect that substantial or
commercially significant noninfringing uses were likely to develop over time" and that
"the District Court should not have ruled dispositively on the contributory infringement
charge by granting summary judgment to Grokster and StreamCast." Id. at 2786
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). Three other judges were instead of the opinion that Grokster
and StreamCast pass the Sony test because their products were capable of substantial or
commercially significant noninfringing uses. Id. at 2788-89 (Breyer, J., concurring). See
also Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1379 et seq. (2004) (discussing the
general drawbacks of suing facilitators of copyright infringement and thereby banning
certain technologies).
39. Lemley & Reese, supra note 38, at 1365; see also MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster
Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2794-95 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); Justin Hughes, On the Logic
of Suing One's Customers and the Dilemma of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725 (2005).
40. See Department of Justice Brings First Criminal Enforcement Action Against Peer-
to-Peer Copyright Piracy, 21 The COMPUTER AND INTERNET LAWYER 33 (2004).
41. On U.S. law in that respect see A&M Recording, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.COM, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d
349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003).
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obvious whether the same is true with respect to downloading works
as an act of reproduction. 2 A Canadian court held that downloading
copyrighted content for private use does not amount to infringement
under Canadian law. Moreover, because at the time of the decision
Canada had not implemented the WCT, the making available right
did not form part of the Canadian copyright law.43 Under current
German copyright law, it has not yet been established whether each
and every download of a work from a p2p network is unlawful.
Section 53(1) of the German Copyright Act limits the exclusive right
of reproduction with regard to digital private copies. However, such a
private copy must not be made from an "obviously illegally made"
original copy. The problem with this additional requirement for a
privileged private copy is that works available for download in p2p
networks may well be "made" legally (because they are an admissible
private copy made by the uploader). In order to clear up this
uncertainty, the German Ministry of Justice proposed amending Sec.
53(1) of the German Copyright Act to read that a digital private copy
is illegal if made from an original that has been "obviously illegally
made or publicly made available."4  Under this provision,
downloading works from p2p networks would always amount to
copyright infringement because every upload is obviously illegal.
In order to pursue up- and downloaders, right holders need to
know the identity of the alleged infringer in order to enforce their
exclusive rights. The obligation of Internet Service Providers (ISP) to
42. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2782 (2005); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2001); Sony Music Entm't
Inc. v. Does 1-40, 71 USPQ 2d 1661, 1668 (S.D. N.Y 2004) (holding that downloading and
distribution of copyrighted music via p2p networks constitutes copyright infringement).
On the nature of the infringement involved in transferring files over p2p networks under
U.S. law, see R. Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing
Law, Major Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 258-59 (2001).
See also Lemley & Reese, supra note 38, at 1413 ("Making a copyrighted work available
for any other person to copy is much more likely to constitute copyright infringement than
is any individual instance of downloading, where the downloader's act of reproduction
might well be excused as fair use or by some other defense."); Ulrich Baumer et al.,
Napster, Gnutella, Kazaa and Beyond: Can the Music Industry Win the Battle against File-
Sharing Networks?, 2004 COMPUTER L. REV. INT'L (CRi) 129; CBO, supra note 1, at 15.
43. BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, 2004 FC 488, at 14-16 (Federal Court 2004). No
such findings were made by the Court of Appeal. See BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, 2005
FCA 193, at para. 46-54 (Federal Court of Appeal 2005). A bill of the Minister of
Canadian Heritage, No. C-60 for an "Act to amend the Copyright Act" of June 20, 2005,
would implement the obligations under the WCT and the WPPT in Canadian copyright
law, including the right of making available, http://www.parl.gc.ca[PDF/38/1l/parlbus/
chambus/housebills/government/C-60_l.pdf.
44. See Bill for a "Second Act on Copyright in the Information Society", supra note
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reveal the identity of users of the network as alleged copyright
infringers is the subject of intensive litigation in several jurisdictions.45
After failing to persuade courts that the DMCA established a
respective obligation of ISPs,46 the RIAA filed John Doe lawsuits and
after that sought subpoenas against the ISPs controlling those IP
addresses."
B. Patterns of Reaction to P2P File Sharing
In light of these developments, one commentator rightly
describes the current situation as a "kind of logjam."4 On the one
hand, p2p networks are still intensely used and technologically
improved for the sharing of digitized content, which is partially
copyrighted. On the other hand, right holders are trying everything to
bring an end to this allegedly harmful institution. This is not to say
that no proposals have been made regarding how to resolve this
conflict. On the contrary, postulations cover the whole spectrum,
from "abolish copyright" to "abolish p2p networks."
Two approaches would not require legislative actions. First, a
"wait-and-see approach" argues that the market will bring an efficient
45. For cases arising in the U.S., see Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon
Internet, 351 F.3d 1229, 1231-32 (C.A.D.C. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 309 (2004), and
cert. denied sub nom. Verizon Internet Services, Inc. v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am.,
Inc., 125 S. Ct. 347 (2004) (holding that there is no obligation of ISPs to identify alleged
infringers under the DMCA); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Univ. of N. C. at Chapel
Hill, 74 USPQ 2d 1661 (M.N.C. 2005). For Canadian precedent, see BMG Canada Inc. v.
John Doe, 2005 FCA 193 (Federal Court of Appeal 2005). In Great Britain, the High
Court in London has granted a court order forcing ISPs to reveal the names of illegal
music swappers. See Arthur Rogers, British Court Orders ISPs to Reveal Identities of
Several Dozen Alleged Copyright Infringers, 9 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. (BNA) 856
(2004). For cases arising in Germany, see Hamburg District Court, Computer und Recht
(CR) 136 (2005); Cologne District Court, Zeitschrift ftir Urheber- und Medienrecht
(ZUM) 236 (2005) (holding that there is an obligation of ISPs under German copyright
law to identify alleged large scale users of p2p networks); contra Frankfurt/Main Court of
Appeals, Kommunikation und Recht (K&R) 138 (2005) (denying an obligation of ISPs to
disclose the identity of users of p2p networks).
46. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1231-32, cert. denied, S. Ct. Cases 03-1579/03-1722; Recording
Industry Association of America v. Charter Communications Inc., 73 USPO 2d 1339 (8th
Cir. 2005).
47. See Sony, 71 USPQ at 1666-1670 (holding that identities of alleged infringers of
copyright in p2p networks are subject to disclosure through subpoena served on nonparty
Internet service provider by plaintiff record companies); Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp. v. Does 1-12, No. C 04-04862 WHA, 2004 WL 3241669 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2004)
(holding that plaintiffs must sue each alleged file sharer separately absent a showing of
relationship); Lemley & Reese, supra note 38, at 1414 n.279.
48. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-
to-peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 19-22 (2003), available at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/nnetanel.
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result, especially in the form of differential pricing, even if the
legislature refrains from stepping in.49 Second, several commentators
and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) plead for voluntary
collective licensing of exclusive rights. According to the EFF's
proposal, the music industry would form a collecting society, which
would then offer file-sharing users the opportunity to "get legit" by
making a reasonable regular payment (the EFF specifies $5 per
month). So long as they pay, users would be free to download
whatever they like, using whatever software works best for them. 0
The problem with both approaches is that they have not yet
become reality. Copyright owners have established more and more
commercial online ventures that allow users to legally stream and
download works after paying for these uses individually. But neither
these lawful alternatives to file sharing nor civil and criminal actions
have lead to a decrease of traffic in p2p networks.5 ' Thus,
uncontrolled use of copyrighted works takes place without generating
revenues for artists and right holders in general. The market has not
solved the problem. Whether it ever will is uncertain. Interestingly
enough, the failure to stop unauthorized file sharing has not put
enough pressure on copyright owners to agree on a voluntary
collecting and licensing scheme as proposed by the EFF and others.
Still, right holders bet on exclusivity in cyberspace.52
Not surprisingly, therefore, both parties have turned their
attention to the legislature. 3 Several proposals have been put
forward, differing substantially with respect to the aim and the
practical solution suggested. At the extremes, "anti-copyright"
49. See CBO, supra note 1, at 28-33.
50. See Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), A Better Way Forward: Voluntary
Collective Licensing of Music, http://www.eff.org/share/collective-licwp.pdf (2004);
Daniel J. Gervais, Copyright, Money & the Internet, paper presented at the "Copyright
Office Comes to California" Conference San Francisco, March 3, 2004, 22-23 (2004)
http://www.commonlaw.uottawa.ca/faculty/prof/dgervais/CopyrightMoneyAndThelnterne
t.pdf (proposing a voluntary licensing system for file sharing, especially in light of
international copyright treaties); Gervais, supra note 11, at 71; Fisher, supra note 1, at 252-
258 (describing a voluntary licensing regime to be implemented if the government were
not willing to step in to impose the tax-based system that Fisher prefers).
51. See Howe, supra note 10.
52. This reluctance of copyright owners is telling with regard to the acceptance of
proposals to establish a non-voluntary licensing regime.
53. See also MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1166-67 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that to fix the flow of Internet innovation is a question to be resolved by
Congress and not by the courts); AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876 (9th
Cir. 1999) (pointing to Congress as the right addressee for a re-examination of copyright
principles in cyberspace).
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models plead for a complete or nearly complete abandonment of
copyright as an exclusive right in the digital network environment
because exclusive rights in cyberspace would do more harm than
good.54 The "beyond copyright model" instead proposes a "digital
lock up" to stop infringing uses on the net.5 Looking for a middle
ground that acknowledges the need of right holders to enforce their
exclusive rights effectively against illegal uses in p2p networks
without banning these technologies altogether, Mark A. Lemley and
R. Anthony Reese have outlined a streamlined, and largely online
administrative proceeding with the Copyright Office that gives
copyright owners a quick, low-cost alternative to enforcing their
rights against individual large-scale uploaders on p2p networks.56
Also somewhere in the middle of this spectrum of control are
proposals for future copyright models regarding p2p networks that
would replace exclusive rights in the copyrightable subject matter
with mandatory remuneration rights. The fundamental notion of
these concepts is that efficient control of the use of p2p network
technology is not possible without banning the technology altogether
or without severe drawbacks with regard to monitoring and privacy.
To avoid these disadvantages, non-commercial file sharing would be
legalized under a limitation of or exception from copyright. Right
holders would be compensated by a levy or tax on products and
services used for file sharing. The congeniality of this solution rests
upon the fact that it preserves the benefits of p2p network
technologies while at the same time guaranteeing an author's
compensation. In Lawrence Lessig's words, it is "compensation
without control.,
57
54. See, e.g., Shih Ray Ku, supra note 1; Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law
Discourages Creative Output: The Overlooked Impact of Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 785 (2004).
55. For an overview on different approaches, see Lionel S. Sobel, Symposium: The
Law and Economics of Digital Rights Management: DRM as an Enabler of Business
Models: ISPs as Digital Retailers, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 670 et seq. (2003);
Netanel, supra note 48, at 7-22, 74-83; Jacover, supra note 4, at 2209-11; Eckersley, supra
note 28, at 86 ("information anarchism and information feudalism"). On filters that stop
infringing uses in p2p networks see Lemley & Reese, supra note 38, at 1385.
56. Lemley & Reese, supra note 38, at 1354 et seq. For a dispute resolution
mechanism through a form of non-binding arbitration which could rapidly resolve
copyright infringement cases on the Internet at low litigation expense, see also Alan R.
Kabat, Proposal for a Worldwide Internet Collecting Society: Mark Twain and Samuel
Johnson Licenses, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 329, 341 (1998).
57. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 201 (Random House 2001); Shih Ray Ku, supra note 1, at 263.
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IlI. Non-Voluntary Licenses Today and Tomorrow
A. Non-Voluntary Licenses in Current Copyright Law
From the outset, national and international copyright laws have
always acknowledged the need to balance the exclusive rights of
authors in their works with the public interest in the dissemination of
knowledge. 8 One way international copyright law has accomplished
this goal has been to recognize the freedom of contracting parties to
provide for limitations from, or exceptions to,59 copyright. As regards
quotations, Art. 10(1) BC even imposes a mandatory requirement to
which each union member must give effect.6
Many limitations/exceptions in national copyright laws, like the
right to make quotations, are remuneration-free. This is especially
true under U.S. copyright law, where fair use and the limitations
regulated in more detail in the following sections are not subject to a
levy. 61  The EC Copyright Directive 2001/29/EC (hereinafter
Copyright Directive) refers to a right to remuneration only with
regard to private copying.62 In some European jurisdictions, notably
Germany, other limitations addressing the public interest in free
speech and the dissemination of knowledge are combined with a right
to remuneration. 63 Of particular interest regarding the proposals on
58. SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 477 (Kluwer Law International 1987).
59. Art. 13 TRIPS, Art. 10 WCT, and Art. 5 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, OJ L 167/10 of June 22, 2001
[hereinafter Copyright Directive] name both alternatives.
60. Ricketson, supra note 58, at 489.
61. See also 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 108, 110, 117, 120, 121 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
62. The Copyright Directive specifically provides the following:
Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the
reproduction right provided for in Article 2 in the following cases:
(a) in respect of reproductions on paper or any similar medium, effected by
the use of any kind of photographic technique or by some other process
having similar effects, with the exception of sheet music, provided that the
rightholders receive fair compensation;
(b) in respect of reproductions on any medium made by a natural person
for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly
commercial, on condition that the rightholders receive fair compensation
which takes account of the application or non-application of technological
measures referred to in Article 6 to the work or subject matter concerned.
Copyright Directive Art. 5(2)(a), (b), supra note 59.
63. LUCIE M.C.R. GUIBAULT, COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND CONTRACTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRACTUAL OVERRIDABILITY OF LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT
28 et seq., 69 et seq. (Kluwer Law International 2002); MARTIN SENFTLEBEN,
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non-commercial file sharing are limitations/exceptions which permit
private copying, but combine this restriction with a right to
remuneration, i.e., a levy on devices used for copying. This approach
goes back to the development and widespread use of technologies for
reproductions in the private sphere (VCRs, cassette recorders, etc.).
Right holders were not able to enforce their exclusive rights against
private copying. In order to compensate for the resulting losses, they
were granted a right to remuneration under a levy system
administered by collecting societies. Such a right to remuneration was
first established in the German Copyright Act of 1965 and was later
adopted in other European countries, as well as, for example, in
Canada.64 It is-to a much more limited extent-also provided under
U.S. copyright law in the form of the Audio Home Recording Act
(AHRA) of 1992.65
COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE-
STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT LAW 22-34 (Kluwer Law
International 2004); CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, DROIT D'AUTEUR ET DROIT DU PUBLIC A
L'INFORMATION. APPROCHE DE DROIT COMPARE para. 213-305 (R.D.T.I. 2004)
(France). For example, the limitation for disabled people according to Sec. 45a German
CA is combined with an obligation to pay an equitable remuneration that is obligatorily
administered by a collecting society, whereas the quotation right (Sec. 51 German CA) is
not subject to a remuneration right.
64. See Copyright Directive, supra note 59, at Art. 5(2)(a), (b); Sec. 53-54h German
CA. For an overview, see Adolf Dietz in: Paul Edward Geller ed., International Copyright
Law & Practice, Germany, § 8(2) (2003). On the historical development, see Jurgen
Weimann, Private Home Taping under Sec. 53(5) of the German Copyright Act of 1965, 30
J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 153 (1982); Reinhold Kreile, Collection and Distribution of the
Statutory Remuneration for Private Copying with Respect to Recorders and Blank Cassettes
in Germany, 23 INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. AND COPYRIGHT L. (tIC) 449 (1992); Adolf
Dietz, Legal Regulation of Collective Management of Copyright (Collecting Societies Law)
in Western and Eastern Europe, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 897 (2002); Katerina Gaita
& Andrew F. Christie, Principle or Compromise? Understanding the Original Thinking
behind Statutory License and Levy Schemes for Private Copying, 8 INTELL. PROP. Q. 422
(2004). See also P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Lucie M.C.R. Guibault & Sjoerd van Geffen, The
Future of Levies in a Digital Environment 13-31 (2003), http://www.ivir.nl/publications/
other/DRM%20Levies%20Final%20Report.pdf (regarding the adoption of this approach
in other European countries); Canadian Private Copying Collective v. Canadian Storage
Media Alliance, 2004 FCA 424 (Federal Court of Appeal, 2004); Gervais, supra note 20;
Gervais, supra note 50 (regarding Canadian copyright law).
65. Pub. L. No. 102-563,106 Stat. 4237; MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING
COPYRIGHT LAW § 8.30 (1999); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 8B.01[C] (2002); Fisher, supra note 1, at 83-87. The AHRA covers only
digital audio recording devices (DCC, DAT). It is not applicable to computers that
facilitate private copying in the digital network environment. Therefore, the AHRA is
irrelevant regarding p2p file sharing. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th. Cir. 1999); A&M Records vs. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004, 1024-25 (9th. Cir. 2001) (holding that the Audio Home Recording Act does not
cover the downloading of MP3 files to computer hard drives); Nimmer at §
8B.02[A][1J[a][ii]; Netanel, supra note 48, at 33 (provisions of the AHRA have remained a
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These limitations/exceptions can be distinguished from
provisions establishing a right to remuneration instead of an exclusive
right in order not to subject secondary uses of copyrighted material
by certain industries (especially in the case of retransmissions) to an
exclusive right which could possibly be exercised in an abusive
manner by the right holder.66 On a more general level, these
provisions are also meant to avoid negative consequences of exclusive
rights in works like the aforementioned limitations/exceptions in
favor of the general public interest. However, they tend to be more
focused on intra-industry related issues.
The terminology and classification of those
limitations/exceptions and the accompanying rights to remuneration
differ substantially in national copyright laws." German copyright law
speaks of statutory remuneration rights (gesetzliche
Vergiitungsanspriiche) or statutory licenses with regard to private
copying as opposed to compulsory licenses, i.e., where the right
holder is obliged to grant a license according to a specific procedure.
8
In contrast, U.S. copyright law and literature use the terms
compulsory license and statutory license synonymously. 69 Since all
alternatives reduce the right holder's proprietary control to a right to
remuneration, ° this article introduces non-voluntary licenses as a
generic term for both statutory licenses and compulsory licenses.7'
dead letter).
66. See Art. 8-12 Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the
coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright
applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, OJ L 248/15 of October 6,
1993. U.S. copyright law also provides a number of non-voluntary licenses of this kind. See
17 U.S.C. §§ 111(d), 112, 114(d), (f), 115, 118, 119, 122 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). For an
overview, see Leaffer, supra note 65, at § 8.2, 8.3; Nimmer, supra note 65, at § 8.18;
Ricketson, supra note 58, at 513.
67. Sirinelli, supra note 20, at 2.
68. See the terminology used in Art. 15 of the Rome Convention for the Protection of
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations; Guibault, supra
note 63, at 20-27; but see Sam Ricketson, WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environment, Standing Committee on
Copyright and Related Rights, Ninth Session, Geneva, June 23 to 27, 2003, WIPO
Document SCCR/9/7 of April 5, 2003 4 (2003), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/
meetings/2003/sccr/pdf/sccr_9_7.pdf, 4 (2003).
69. See e.g. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.8.6.2 (2d ed. 2002).
70. JORG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO-TREATIES Art. 10 WCT
no. 25 (2002).
71. See MIHALY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET. THE 1996
WIPO TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 5.04, 5.123 (Oxford
University Press 2002); Sirinelli, supra note 20, at 3.
The remuneration to be paid will be called a levy or tax, respectively.
All in all, the approach is referred to as the levy/tax system.
Independent of these rather sophisticated differentiations, one
can certainly conclude that the idea not to grant exclusive rights but
to limit these rights to a mere right to indirect remuneration is
nothing new to many national copyright laws. The factual situations
to which these concepts apply vary widely. However, the fundamental
rationale is always the same. Either exclusive rights are practically not
enforceable or their exercise would have too many negative side
effects. To extend these approaches to cyberspace would thus not be
anything completely new.
B. Proposals Regarding P2P File Sharing
Whereas non-voluntary licenses have thus for a long time been
one important instrument to balance the private interest of the right
holder with the public interest in the dissemination of knowledge, a
non-voluntary license covering p2p file sharing does not yet exist in
any national copyright law.72 However, several commentators
advocate models that permit non-commercial file sharing in exchange
for a levy or tax that is meant to compensate the losses incurred by
the right holder.
Without going into details, German and Swiss commentators
state that copyright in the digital network environment will at least
partially have to be replaced or supplemented by levies because
exclusive rights would either not be enforceable or their exercise
would constrain the free flow of information on the Internet. 3 In his
French dissertation, Christophe Geiger discusses several solutions
addressing the fact that copyright as it is today does not meet the
needs of a functioning information society. Among those, the author
lists compulsory licenses, especially for sui generis rights in
databases, 4 and mandatory collective administration of exclusive
72. Netanel, supra note 48, at 32.
73. See PHILIPP WITTGENSTEIN, DIE DIGITALE AGENDA DER WIPO-VERTRAGE
162 (2000) (stating that copyright on the Internet should be transformed from an exclusive
right to a mere remuneration right); Artur-Axel Wandtke, Copyright und virtueller Markt
in der Informationsgesellschaft, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberreht (GRUR) 1, 7
(2002) (arguing that the future protection of authors will probably amount to mere
remuneration rights); Freiwald, supra note 7, at 187-189.
74. Geiger, supra note 63, at para. 371-80. See also Christophe Geiger, Right to Copy
v. Three-Step Test: The Future of the Private Copy Exception in the Digital Envrionment,
2005 COMPUTER L. REV. INT'L (CRi) 7, 10 (stating that it would be preferable to admit
private copying as an enforceable right against technical devices and to solve the problem
by a working system of equitable remuneration).
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rights, where collecting societies have to license certain uses on a non-
discriminating, fair basis,75 a model that ultimately is very similar to a
statutory, non-voluntary license.76
Interestingly, a richer set of proposals for non-voluntary licenses
applied to p2p file sharing can be found in recent U.S.
literature.77Glynn S. Lunney argues that a levy or limited tax on
copying technology and storage media for private copying is
"inescapable," taking into account the dangers of an "encryption-
based approach." '78 Raymond Shih Ray Ku is very much in line with
this reasoning in proposing a "Digital Recording Act" as a second-
best solution if the abolishment of copyright would hamper the
incentive to be creative. This Act would allow file sharing, but would
introduce statutory levies on subscriptions for Internet services and
on the sales of computer, audio, and video equipment. In order to
75. Geiger, supra note 63, at para. 381-84; Guibault, supra note 63, at 26-27. Since
these solutions and new statutory limitations/exceptions do not exist, Geiger proposes
limiting exclusive rights having recourse to fundamental rights (external limitations). See
Geiger, supra note 63, at para. 441-89.
76. See Guibault, supra note 63, at 26-27. On mandatory collective administration of
exclusive rights without the obligation of the collecting society to license certain uses, see
Silke von Lewinski, Mandatory Collective Administration of Exclusive Richts-A Case
Study on Its Compatibility with International and EC Copyright Law, UNESCO
e.Copyright Bulletin, No. 1 2004, available at http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-
URLID=19552&URLD.O=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html.
77. See also Jim Griffin, At Impasse: Technology, Popular Demand, and Today's
Copyright Regime (Apr. 2001), http://www.62chevy.com/at-impasse.htm; Bennett Lincoff,
A Full, Fair and Feasible Solution to the Dilemma of Online Music Licensing (Nov. 2002),
http://www.quicktopic.com/boing/D/uhAMNwVb8yfkc.html; Philip S. Corwin & Lawrence
M. Hadley, P2P: The Path to Prosperity, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 649, 669 (2004);
Eckersley, supra note 28, at 92 ("virtual market reward/remuneration system"). Lionel
Sobel's "Digital Retailers" model (Sobel, supra note 55, at 667, 673 et seq.) should not be
listed among the proponents of a non-voluntary license for non-commercial file sharing.
See Lemley & Reese, supra note 38, at 1410 (2004) (stating that Sobel's model is not a levy
at all, because it depends on identifying and collecting from infringers). Its main
characteristics are that users are-under a statutory license-free to download and stream
copyrighted content. However, copyright holders have a right to digitally identify each
work, its owner, and the wholesale royalty price to be paid by ISPs for its transmission to
users. As content identified in that fashion (by way of fingerprinting or watermarking)
passes through ISPs' routers to their users, ISPs log those transmissions and bill users'
accounts monthly for the content they receive. Sobel's proposition differs from the two
aforementioned models in that it does not deprive copyright owners of the ability to
determine the royalty value of their works independently from an agency. Moreover, users
have to pay individually according to the number of downloads or streams. No tax or levy
is imposed on services or products related to file sharing. Basically, the idea is that ISPs act
as a paying agent for the right holders. Instead of conditioning uses with DRMs. any and
every use is monitored and billed.
78. Glynn S. Lunney, The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying,
and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 910-918 (2001).
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measure the extent of downloads and other uses of digital works on
the Internet, these activities would be technologically tracked and
monitored."9 Speaking in favor of exclusive rights in works as a means
to ensure adequate compensation for artists and right holders, Aric
Jacover pleads for a similar levy or tax system as a second-best
solution if the strategy of "aggressively employing traditional
copyright policies in the Internet distribution market" would not
ensure compensation for the use of works.0 Even these few examples
show that a levy/tax solution forms a compromise between ever-
expanding exclusivity and abandonment of copyright. Advocates of
both extreme approaches refer to levies as the second-best solution.
Others plead for a levy/tax system as regards p2p file sharing not
only as the second-best, but as the primary solution. Among these
ranks Neil Netanel with his proposal for a "Noncommercial Use
Levy."81 His model permits-as a right protected by law that cannot
be waived contractually-noncommercial copying, online distribution
in p2p networks (download), streaming, and adaptation of published
copyrighted works (except software), provided that the derivative
creator clearly identifies the underlying work and indicates that it has
been modified, in return for a levy which is-provided that
negotiations have failed-set by a Copyright Office Tribunal at a "fair
return/fair income" rate (some four percent of the retail price of the
goods/services). The levy has to be paid by providers of products and
services whose value is enhanced by file swapping (Internet access,
p2p software and services, computer hardware, consumer electronic
devices such as CD writers, MP3 players, digital video recorders and
storage media such as blank CDs). The allocation of the collected
money is made in accordance with the actual use of the content as
measured by technology that tracks and monitors the use.
Apparently, Netanel does not concede to copyright holders the right
to withdraw their works from the levy system and to opt for exclusive
exploitation on the basis of digital rights management instead."
79. Shih Ray Ku, supra note 1, at 311-15; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Symposium: The
Law and Economics of Digital Rights Management Consumers and Creative Destruction:
Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539, 566 n.160 (2003).
80. Jacover, supra note 4, at 2250-54 (referencing Kabat, supra note 56, at 336-37,
who proposed a Worldwide Internet Collecting Society (WICS) which---contrary to the
proposals discussed in this article-was meant to administer the exclusive rights of authors
in cyberspace).
81. Netanel, supra note 48, at 4, 35-59.
82. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the negative consequences regarding the
compliance of the proposal with international copyright law).
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In a proposal that bears much resemblance to Netanel's
"Noncommercial Use Levy," William Fisher outlines an
administrative compensation system,83 even providing detailed figures
on the amount of taxes that would be needed to compensate the
losses expected to result from the reduction of exclusive rights.'
Fisher sketches his model as follows:
The owner of the copyright in an audio or video recording
who wished to be compensated when it was used by others
would register it with the Copyright Office and would
receive, in return, a unique file name, which then would be
used to track its distribution, consumption, and
modification. The government would raise the money
necessary to compensate copyright owners through a tax-
most likely, a tax on devices and services that consumers use
to gain access to digital entertainment. Using techniques
pioneered by television rating services and performing
rights organizations, a government agency would estimate
the frequency with which each song and film was listened to
or watched. The tax revenues would then be distributed to
copyright owners in proportion to the rates with which their
registered works were being consumed. Once this
alternative regime were in place, copyright law would be
reformed to eliminate most of the current prohibitions on
unauthorized reproduction and use of published recorded
music and films.'
Fisher allows right holders a hybrid marketing strategy, i.e., to
sell copy-protected CDs while simultaneously distributing
unencrypted versions of the song, receiving shares of the tax for these
uses.86 Copyright owners would also be free to implement DRM
without registering their work for the tax system. 7 The statutory
default, however, would be a limitation for non-commercial file
sharing. It would also apply to works not registered.8
83. Fisher, supra note 1, at 199-251.
84. Fisher, supra note 1, at 214 ($2.389 billion would have to be raised for copyright
owners in movies, musical works and sound recordings).
85. Id. at 9.
86. Id. at 248.
87. Id. See also infra Part IV.B.2, V.B.3 (discussing the potential of this solution to
comply with international copyright law treaties).
88. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 204 (stating that if a work was not registered, the use
would be lawful, but uncompensated); id. at 247 ("[I]f a copyright owner opted out of the
system entirely, releasing only an encrypted version of his or her recording .... ). The
relationship between Fisher's alternative compensation system and exclusive exploitation
In "The Future of Ideas," Lawrence Lessig argued that file
sharing should be empowered by recognizing a similar system of
compulsory licenses as in the case of cable retransmission, the fee
being set by a policy maker striking the right balance. 9 In his 2004
book "Free Culture," he still agrees with Fisher's proposal, but he
also stresses that the current p2p network technology might become
irrelevant when faster and easier Internet access will empower users
to switch from downloading to streaming content from a commercial
service to which they subscribe. Due to this possible technological
development, Fisher's system would only serve for the interim to the
extent that actual harm is demonstrated.'
Jessica Litman differentiates between "sharing" and "hoarding"
as the two possible ways to exploit works on the Internet.91 By that,
she means that right holders can choose between letting their works
be shared in p2p networks in exchange for a blanket fee or levy/tax
disbursed primarily to the musicians and composers, and hoarding
their works in exclusively exploited online ventures, protected by
DRM. Sharing would be the legal default rule.9 However, right
holders would be able to opt out of the levy system. To this end, they
would have to make their work available in a certain DRM format
capable of conveying copyright management information, as defined
in 17 U.S.C. § 1202, that incorporates and facilitates digital rights
management.9 3 If they had already released their works in other
formats, they still could-after a 24-month grace period before any
withdrawal would take effect-withdraw it from the levy/tax system.
In order to do so, however, they would have to recall copies of the
work released in other formats, and offer any consumers who own
is not entirely clear. Apparently, to use DRM instead of registering the work is to be an
option only for new releases and only at the time of first publication. Moreover, it is
doubtful whether the right holder who implemented technological measures would be
entitled to enforce her exclusive rights against the sharing of copies made by
circumventing the technological protection measure. Fisher sketches an opt-out
mechanism only as regards the proposed limitation of the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works. See id. at 240-42, 246.
89. Lessig, supra note 57, at 254-55.
90. Lessig, supra note 3, at 298, 301. See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S
HIGHWAY. FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 202-03 (2d ed. 2003).
91. Jessica D. Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 39-
50 (2004).
92. Id. at 41. See also infra Part V.B.2.b (discussing the consequences of this solution
for the compliance with international copyright law).
93. Litman, supra note 91, at 46-48.
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authorized, commercial copies in a non-DRM format the opportunity
to exchange those copies for DRM copies at no charge.9
Summing up, these concepts take the same starting point:
"compensation without control" is considered to be the best way to
reap the fruits of the digital network technologies for authors and the
general public alike. Nevertheless, important differences can be
observed. For example, not all models afford the copyright owner the
right to withhold her work from the levy/tax system and opt for
exclusivity in cyberspace instead. Even those that do so, including
Jessica Litman and William Fisher, advocate "sharing" as the legal
default. As will be shown in the following sections of this article, these
differences are important when addressing the question of
compliance with international copyright law. It should finally be
noted that the mentioned proposals are already influencing current
political debates about copyright and file sharing. Whereas content
holders propose the application of software filters that check files on
the fly and order the user's computer to terminate a download if the
file's "fingerprint" matches that of a restricted song contained in an
online database, providers of p2p network software and services
advocate a collective licensing regime similar to that currently applied
to broadcast radio and webcasting under U.S. copyright law.9
C. Pros and Cons of Non-Voluntary Licenses and Levies
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the economic and
social assets and drawbacks of non-voluntary licenses in the field of
copyright law." Whether and to what extent-speaking in economic
terms-liability rules should replace property rules with regard to
intangible goods such as copyrightable works has been discussed for
some time and is to a large extent dependent on the aim that the
respective commentator wants to achieve with copyright protection in
general.7
94. Id. at 48.
95. See Michael Warnecke, P2P United Pushes Collective Licenses While RIAA Sees
Filters as Better Solution, 9 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. (BNA) 204, 204-05 (2004);
Netanel, supra note 48, at 35-36. In the current discussion about the next amendment of
the German Copyright Act, a proposal by two private organizations entitled
Kompensation ohne Kontrolle (on file with the author) draws explicitly on Lessig's
"compensation without control."
96. See Sobel, supra note 55, at 667,687-88; Eckersley, supra note 28, at 116-52.
97. See Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in NATIONAL BUREAU FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND THE COMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS, 602, 623
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The advantages of non-voluntary licenses are often summarized
as acknowledging the public-good character of a work that should be
disseminated to the greatest extent possible,98 but at the same time
providing revenue for authors, which might be even higher for single
creators than under a system where an intermediary governs the
exploitation of the work on the basis of exclusive rights. Transaction
and enforcement costs are reduced. Moreover, the structure of p2p
networks makes it very difficult for copyright owners to exercise
meaningful control over their works once a single copy is available on
the network. Therefore, alternative, indirect compensation methods
are particularly reasonable.9 Compared to Lemley and Reese's
proposal for easier enforcement mechanisms to efficiently deter
keystone uploaders, a non-voluntary license system would not
diminish the available content on the network.' °
Several objections have been made to liability rules in the
context of intellectual property. ° The primary argument is that
liability rules are generally only the second-best solution compared to
individual licensing. This "crude and rough justice measure" suffers
from severe practical problems, especially in determining a "fair"
compensation. The administration of the system incurs high costs.
Under a broad levy regime, large numbers of consumers cross-
subsidise a relatively limited group of private copiers, whereas right
holders become totally dependent on remuneration administered by
collecting societies. In addition, it negatively affects the (increasingly
'digital') economy by distorting emerging markets that provide for
price differentiation and thus for an efficient property regime."2
Finally, reducing exclusive rights to remuneration rights compromises
(1962); Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON.
1 (1969); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
98. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 38, at 1381 (discussing the efficiency of p2p
networks in disseminating content).
99. Lunney, supra note 78, at 910-18; Lessig, supra note 57, at 204-05; Sobel, supra
note 55, at 687; Shih Ray Ku, supra note 1, at 314; Netanel, supra note 48, at 6, 67; Fisher,
supra note 1, 236-38; Litman, supra note 91, at 30-50.
100. Lemley & Reese, supra note 38, at 1408 n.254.
101. See e.g. Hugenholtz et al., supra note 64, at 41; Goldstein, supra note 90, at 187-
216; CBO, supra note 1, at 34; Michael A. Einhorn, Digitization and Its Discontents:
Digital Rights Management, Access Protection, and Free Markets, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
USA 279, 292 (2004); Lemley & Reese, supra note 38, at 1408-10; Robert P. Merges,
Compulsory Licensing vs. the Three "Golden Oldies" Property, Contract Rights and
Markets, CATO Institute Policy Analysis No. 508 (2004),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa508.pdf.
102. CBO, supra note 1, at 23-26; Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price
Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001).
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the credibility of the copyright system as such, because users will
believe that there is a "license to copy."
Both lines of argumentation are comprehensible. The
Congressional Budget Office Paper on Copyright Issues in Digital
Media of August 2004 ends with the recommendation: "Any revisions
that are undertaken, therefore, require careful deliberation."'03 It is,
however, very hard-if not impossible-to tell which solution is
actually more efficient in a given case, for example with respect to file
sharing."
If we accept the notion that we do not know exactly where the
optimal trade-off between access and incentive lies, a normative, even
positivistic point of view becomes more attractive. 5 This approach
has to take its start from international copyright law, which is binding
upon most countries in the world, including the U.S., the EC, and its
member states. This body of law sets the stage for national copyright
amendments, since the alternatives are either practically out of reach
103. CBO, supra note 1, at 37.
104. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2793-96 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); CBO, supra note 1, at vii-ix; David McGowan, Copyright
Nonconsequentialism, 69 Mo. L. REV. 1 (2004) ("It is easy to say that the right to exclude
is needed to provide incentives for authors. It is hard to show that any particular rules
provide optimal incentives. It is easy to point to deviations from the model of perfect
competition. It is hard to show why these deviations imply particular rules."); Lemley &
Reese, supra note 38, at 1391 (2004) (on the difficulties of quantifying harms and benefits
of decisions regarding innovation, but rejecting McGowan's abandonment of utilitarian
analysis); Epstein, supra note 1, at 38-39 ("Quite simply, any system of private property
imposes heavy costs of exclusion. However, these costs can only be eliminated by adopting
some system of collective ownership that for its part imposes heavy costs of governance.
The only choice that we have is to pick the lesser of two evils."); Nadel, supra note 54, at
855-56 (arguing that current copyright law "probably" reduces the overall number of new
creations, while an abridgment of 17 U.S.C. § 106 would "likely" increase social welfare);
Kamiel J. Koelman, Copyright Law and Economics in the EU Copyright Directive: Is the
Droit d'Auteur PassO?, 35 IIC 603, 619 (2004) ("[I]t is impossible to know the optimal
trade-off between incentive and non-rivalry."); Eckersley, supra note 28, at 150 ("[S]ociety
could, on the balance of probabilities, expect better outcomes under a well-implemented
alternative compensation system than under a well-implemented system of
technologically-enforced exclusive rights .... ).
105. This is, however, not to say that economics should not play a role in copyright law
and policy. Economic analysis can improve our understanding of an optimal copyright
protection. See Alexander Peukert, Der Schutzbereich des Urheberrechts und das Werk als
offentliches Gut. Insbesondere: Die urheberrechtliche Relevanz des privaten Werkgenusses,
in RETO M. HILTY & ALEXANDER PEUKERT (ED.), INTERESSENAUSGLEICH IM
URHEBERRECHT 11, 12-25 (2004); Pamela Samuelson, Should Economics Play a Role in
Copyright Law and Policy?, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. (UOLTJ) 1-21 (2003-2004);
contra McGowan, supra note 104, at 72 (2004) ("The debate would be clearer if we spent
less time swapping utilitarian narratives that cannot be falsified and more time
acknowledging the first principles that drive the narratives, and debating those principles
on their own terms.").
within a reasonable time-i.e., amendment of the treaties or
termination of membership-or they are untenable from a lawyer's
point of view-i.e., they disregard international law.
IV. International Copyright Law
In the following section this article adopts a positivistic view in
analyzing the above-mentioned proposals. In particular, it will discuss
whether the three-step test conflicts with the implementation of the
suggested regimes in national copyright law. Basically, the three-step
test establishes general limits for national legislatures to impose
limitations on and exceptions to exclusive rights. In other words, it
marks the borderline between exclusivity and non-voluntary
licenses." Additionally, this section will consider the obligation of
contracting parties of the WIPO Copyright Treaties to provide
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the
circumvention of effective technological measures.""
The proposals for levy/tax systems to cover non-commercial file
sharing deal with these issues marginally at best. Some articles do not
address this question at all.1°8 Lawrence Lessig acknowledges that
"some of the changes" he proposes would require amendments to "or
the abrogation of some treaties," listing the BC, the WIPO Treaties
106. See Senftleben, supra note 63, at 118-124 (discussing the functions of the three
step test). The following discussion will not deal with specific restrictions on the exercise
of exclusive rights as laid down in Art. 10, llbis(2, 3), 13 BC (Fisher, supra note 1, at 248-
49, refers to Art. 13 BC and states that the Berne Convention had to be modified to adopt
his system. The reference to Art. 13 BC as a possible basis for a non-voluntary license is
mistaken because Art. 13 BC seeks to benefit record manufacturing companies; see
Ricketson, supra note 58, at 513-22.). Nor will international conventions on the protection
of performing artists, broadcasters, and producers of phonograms be considered. Finally,
the so-called minor exceptions or reservations doctrine will not be separately addressed,
which is derived from statements made during the 1967 Stockholm conference according
to which certain minor limitations/exceptions are acceptable. The reason is that it is
generally acknowledged that this doctrine does not give contracting parties discretion
beyond the limits set by the three-step test. See Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5)
of US Copyright Act, supra note 22, at para. 6.42-70, 6.81; Ricketson, supra note 58, at 533-
42; Ricketson, supra note 68, at 53; Mihily Ficsor, How Much of What? The Three-Step
Test and Its Application in Two Recent WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, 192 Revue
Internationale du Droit d'Auteur (RIDA) 111, 209-15 (2002); Ficsor, supra note 71, at
5.59-66; Reinbothe & von Lewinski, supra note 70, at Art. 10 WCT no. 2, 31.
107. See Art. 11 WCT, 18 WPPT.
108. See Lunney, supra note 78, at 910-18; Sobel, supra note 55, at 673; Shih Ray Ku,
supra note 1, at 311-15; Shih Ray Ku, supra note 79, at 566 n.160; Lemley & Reese, supra
note 38, at 1414-31 (hinting only at the widespread adoption of TRIPS and the Berne
Convention). Eckersley, supra note 28, at 152-58, is the only proponent of a tax/levy
system for file sharing who offers a more detailed discussion of Art. 13 TRIPS.
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and TRIPS.'09 William Fisher briefly explicates that his proposed
limitation to exclusive rights ' would necessitate amendment of the
BC and the TRIPS Agreement. Only Art. 13 BC would allow some
flexibility with regard to music.11' According to Jessica Litman, a
model in which the right holder can withdraw her work from the levy
system would "at least arguably" be "compliant" with treaty
obligations under Berne and the WIPO treaties."2 She apparently,
however, doubts whether her proposal for a levy/tax system as the
statutory default rule with an opt-out-procedure for right holders to
be eligible for exclusive exploitation comports with the prohibition of
formalities for copyright protection under the BC.'13 Finally, Neil
Netanel states that the levy he proposes would comport with Art. 13
TRIPS because it would be limited to non-commercial uses and
would provide a solution to the practical implausibility of enforcing
proprietary copyrights in the global p2p arena.'14 The following
section will analyze which of these clearly differing assessments at
least arguably proves correct.
A. Overview
All aforementioned proposals draw upon a limitation of or
exception to exclusive rights. With some differences in detail, the
concepts permit non-commercial reproduction, distribution and
public performance (streaming) of a musical composition, sound
recording, or motion picture via the Internet. "5 Thus, they restrict the
109. Lessig, supra note 57, at 251 n.14.
110. Fisher, supra note 1, at 247 (proposes a new section 107A that would permit:
* Reproduction of a musical composition, sound recording, or motion picture for
noncommercial purposes (i.e., consumption, not resale);
e Preparation of a derivative work of a sound recording or motion picture registered
pursuant to the new scheme, provided that the derivative work is also so registered before
it is made available to the public;
* Distribution of a sound recording (including a musical composition embodied therein) or
motion picture via the Internet;
* Public performance of a sound recording (including a musical composition embodied
therein) via a digital audio transmission;
* Public performance of a motion picture via a digital video transmission.).
111. Fisher, supra note 1, at 248-49.
112. Litman, supra note 91, at 45-46.
113. Litman, supra note 91, at 46 n.166.
114. Netanel, supra note 48, at 60 n.199.
115. Fisher, supra note 1, at 247; Netanel, supra note 48, at 37-38 (non-commercial
copying, distribution, and streaming over digital networks); Sobel, supra note 55, at 683
(copying and redistribution online). Fisher's and Netanel's concepts additionally permit
derivative creations. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 234-36, 247; Netanel, supra note 48, at 38-
40. Since this form of use is not necessarily involved in file sharing, this article does not
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reproduction right and the right of communication to the public,
which includes the right to make protected content available to the
public. Both rights are regulated as mandatory minimum rights in
international copyright law. "6
These exclusive rights are subject to the three-step test, which
was adopted 1967 in Art. 9(2) BC 1 7 and later in Art. 13 TRIPS," Art.
10 WCT" 9 and Art. 16(2) WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty (WPPT).'" It proclaims that contracting parties may, in their
national legislation, provide for limitations of or exceptions to the
rights granted to authors:
1. in certain special cases;
2. that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work;
and
3. do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author.
The named provisions are regulated in different international
conventions and treaties which have-especially regarding the
purpose of the TRIPS Agreement to reduce distortions of and
impediments to international trade-partially different goals. 21
dwell on this proposal.
116. See Art. 9 BC; art. 9(1) TRIPS; agreed statement concerning art. 1(4)
WCT(reproduction right); art. 11, llbis(1), llter(i), 14(1), 14bis(l) BC; art. 8 WCT; art.
10, 14 WPPT(right of communication to the public).
117. Report on the Work of Main Committee I of the Conference in Stockholm 1967,
reprinted in: WIPO, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS FROM 1886 TO 1986 (CENTENARY) 196-97 (1986) [hereinafter Report
Stockholm 1967]. Art. 9(2) BC applies only to the reproduction right as regulated in
paragraph one of that article.
118. Art. 13 TRIPS is not confined to the rights newly introduced by the TRIPS
Agreement, but also applies to the rights provided for under the BC. See Panel Report,
United States-Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, supra note 22, at para. 6.80; Ficsor, supra
note 106, at 153, 163; Ricketson, supra note 68, at 47.
119. Art. 10(1) WCT covers the rights added by the WCT. See Reinbothe & von
Lewinski, supra note 70, at Art. 10 WCT no. 26. Paragraph 2 relates to the rights provided
for in the BC. See agreed statement to art. 10(2) WCT ("It is also understood that Article
10(2) neither reduces nor extends the scope of applicability of the limitations and
exceptions permitted by the Berne Convention."); Reinbothe & von Lewinski, supra note
70, at Art. 10 WCT no. 6.
120. For the purpose of this study, I assume that the country that considers
implementing one of the proposals is a member of or contracting party to the BC, the
TRIPS Agreement and the WIPO Copyright Treaties. The three-step test is also regulated
in Copyright Directive, supra note 59, Art. 5(5). In this regard, see German Federal
Supreme Court, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 1000, 1004 (1999); Stuttgart Court of Appeals,
Zeitschrift fur Urheber- und Medienrecht (ZUM) 614, 618 (2001); Senftleben, supra note
63, at 245-81.
121. According to the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement, it is also "taking into
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Nevertheless, this article will not analyze the provisions individually
because each wording is practically identical and all provisions derive
from Art. 9(2) BC.122 Moreover, this article does not attempt a
comprehensive interpretation of the three-step test according to the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.2 3 Rather, it summarizes
how national courts, the WTO Panel, and legal literature construe the
elements of the test. It then applies these definitions to concepts for a
levy/tax system for p2p file sharing.
B. Interpretation of the Three-Step Test
As regards the interpretation of the three-step test, it is
undisputed that the three steps have to be applied cumulatively'24 and• 121
successively. In addition, it is generally acknowledged that in
construing the provisions of the three-step test, one has to keep in
mind the overall aim of the conventions: to provide for adequate,
balanced copyright protection.'
1. Certain Special Cases
The first condition established by the three-step test is that
limitations of or exceptions to exclusive rights may be introduced only
in certain special cases.As with all other elements of the test,
divergent opinions exist as to what this requirement means in detail.
Some argue that a restriction in national law must be clearly defined
account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property
rights." In this respect, it parallels the WCT ("to develop and maintain the protection of
the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works in a manner as effective and
uniform as possible") and the BC ("to protect, in as effective and uniform a manner as
possible, the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works").
122. With regard to Art. 13 TRIPS see Art. 2(2), 9(1) TRIPS; DANIEL GERVAIS, THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 2.124 (2d ed. 2003); Panel
Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, supra note 22, at para. 6.66;
Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 35; Senftleben, supra note 63, at 99 et seq. But see Gervais,
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, at 2.11.
123. See Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, supra
note 22, at para. 6.43-46; Ricketson, supra note 58, at 134-42; Ricketson, supra note 68, at
5-9; Senftleben, supra note 63, at 99-114.
124. Failure to comply with any one of the three conditions results in the
limitation/exception being disallowed. See Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of
the US Copyright Act, supra note 22, at para. 6.74, 6.97; Reinbothe & von Lewinski, supra
note 70, at Art. 10 WCT no. 14.
125. See the Records of the WCT negotiations, reproduced in Ficsor, supra note 71,
5.134; Ficsor, supra note 106, at 120-21; Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 40-41.
126. With regard to the BC see Ricketson, supra note 68, at 47-48 (a pure "maximalist"
view is mistaken); Ficsor, supra note 71, 5.06-8. Regarding Art. 7 and 8 TRIPS, see Panel
Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, supra note 22, at para. 7.26.
Regarding the WCT, see Reinbothe & von Lewinski, supra note 70, at Art. 10 WCT no. 7.
and should be narrow in its scope.127 The scope of the exception has to
be known and particularized so that it becomes foreseeable whether a
given use will be subject to the limitation/exception. 28 Although it
seems clear that this condition does not rule out concepts like fair
dealing or fair use, "an incalculable, shapeless provision exempting a
wide variety of different uses" is deemed to be impermissible. 29
Moreover, the WTO Panel held that the business exemption of 17
U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) is not a "certain special case" because a
"substantial majority of eating and drinking establishments and close
to half of retail establishments" are covered by the exemption.3 '
Thus, the Panel adopted a quantitative view regarding the first step.1
31
Regarding the "specialness" of the limitation or exception, some
commentators ask whether some clear reason of public policy or
rational basis for justification exists for the restriction;'32 whether
there is an understandable need for the reconciliation of the user's
interests with the author's interests. 133 However, the WTO Panel
views the legitimacy of public policy as only of subsidiary relevance in
applying the first element of the test. 34
127. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, supra note
22, at para. 6.112; Ricketson, supra note 58, at 482; Ficsor, supra note 106, at 129, 227;
Reinbothe & von Lewinski, supra note 70, at Art. 10 WCT no. 15. With regard to Art. 30
TRIPS ("limited exceptions"), see Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products, supra note 22, at para. 7.30; Gervais, supra note 122, at 2.125;
Ficsor, supra note 106, at 151 (extensive use of compulsory licensing not in line with Art.
13 TRIPS).
128. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, supra note
22, at para. 6.108; Senftleben, supra note 63, at 137.
129. Senftleben, supra note 63, at 133-137. Due to the fact that few countries would act
in a purely arbitrary way and any exception short of a complete repeal of the Copyright
Act would arguably be a certain special case, Gervais, supra note 20, at 17, argues that
only the second and third step really embody a restriction to future limitations and
exceptions.
130. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, supra note
22, at para. 6.133. Contra Senftleben, supra note 63, at 140-44 (disapproving the
quantitative approach of the WTO Panel because the outcome of the second criterion is
predetermined).
131. But see Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
supra note 22, at para. 7.49 (holding that the first step does not directly address the issue of
economic impact); Ficsor, supra note 106, at 229 (critical of this purely statistical
approach).
132. Ricketson, supra note 58, at 482; Ficsor, supra note 106, at 129-32, 227; Reinbothe
& von Lewinski, supra note 70, at Art. 10 WCT no. 15; but see Ricketson, supra note 68, at
22.
133. Senftleben, supra note 63, at 144-152.
134. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, supra note
22, at para. 6.102-13; Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 39-43 (no normative inquiry at this point);
Ricketson, supra note 68, at 22.
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In my view, a non-voluntary license in national copyright law
privileging non-commercial file sharing on the Internet could quite
possibly establish a certain special case under the three-step test.
First, a limitation or exception that is geared towards non-commercial
reproduction and communication to the public with regard to p2p
networks is clearly defined and can easily be distinguished from
impermissible uses. For example, posting a work on a website or
running a "p2p dark net" where users have access only on a
subscription basis would not be privileged because these uses have
nothing to do with p2p technology (posting a work on a website) or
are made for commercial purposes (running a "dark net"). Second,
advocates of non-voluntary license regimes indicate several
justifications: namely, their concepts would preserve the promising
advantages of global digital networks for instant and global
dissemination of knowledge, especially regarding works that are no
longer exploited and offered by the right holder.'35 Third, the
"quantitative" approach taken by the WTO Panel misconceives that
the scope of the limitation/exception and its consequences on the
proprietary exploitation of the work in general must be analyzed
under the second step, not the first. 36
2. Conflict with a Normal Exploitation
Proceeding to step two, the proposals must not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work. This element of the three-step test
probably raises the most doubts regarding its scope of application and
its effect on national copyright legislation.
a. What Constitutes Normal Exploitation Under the Three-Step Test?
First of all, it is of utmost importance to note that, according to a
nearly uniformly accepted understanding based on the wording and
structure of the test, a non-voluntary license may only be introduced
in national law if it clears this hurdle. In particular, the
implementation of a levy cannot cure a conflict of the underlying
limitation/exception with the second step, even if it compensates for
the losses of the copyright owner. This aspect is relevant only with
regard to step three.37
135. On the assets of the proposals, see supra Part III.C; Lessig, supra note 3, at 296-
97. But see Ricketson, supra note 68, at 75 (unqualified assertion of "public interest" is not
enough); Senftleben, supra note 63, at 162 (with regard to digital private copying).
136. Senftleben, supra note 63, at 140-144.
137. Report Stockholm 1967, supra note 117, at 197 (the sequence would afford a
more logical order for the interpretation of the rule); Panel Report, United States-Section
In defining "normal" exploitation, it is accepted that something
less than full use of an exclusive right has to be meant in order not to
render every restriction impermissible and thus the provision itself
superfluous. 3 8 Moreover, "normal" implies an empirical and a
normative element.
139
Regarding the empirical side (the degree of market displacement
following from the restriction), different standards have been
articulated. It has been maintained that a limitation/exception
conflicts with normal exploitation if:
It causes a serious loss of profit;"4
It covers uses for which the author would ordinarily expect to
receive a fee; or 4 '
It applies to those forms of exploitation that currently generate
significant or tangible revenue or which, with a certain degree of
likelihood and plausibility, could acquire considerable economic
or practical importance as opposed to uses that do not compete
with non-exempted uses (actual and potential effects).'
The prevailing opinion judges the existence of a conflict with
normal exploitation for each exclusive right separately.'43 Contrary to
this view, Senftleben refers to a deprivation of an actual or potential
market, which typically constitutes a major source of income, which
110(5) of the US Copyright Act, supra note 22, at para. 6.73-4; Ginsburg, supra note 20, at
45-53; CLAUDE MASOUYt, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971) 55-56 (1978); Ricketson, supra
note 58, at 483-485; Ricketson, supra note 68, at 27; HENRI DESBOIS ET AL., LES
CONVENTIONS INTERNATIONALES DU DROIT D'AUTEUR ET DES DROIT VOISINS para.
173 (1976); Ficsor, supra note 71, at 5.58; Senftleben, supra note 63, at 130-1. Contra
Geiger, supra note 63, at para. 418-420; Christophe Geiger, Comment, 36 INT'L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. (IIC) 151,157 (2005) (proposing to read the three-step
test backwards and to start with the third step in order to accomplish a flexible, balanced
system).
138. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, supra note
22, at para. 6.167.
139. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, supra note
22, at para. 6.166-78; Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
supra note 22, at para. 7.54; Ficsor, supra note 106, at 139.
140. Masouyd, supra note 137, at 56.
141. Ricketson, supra note 58, at 482-3; Ricketson, supra note 68, at 23; contra Kamiel
J. Koelman, De nationale driestappentoets, 17 Tijdschrift voor Auteurs-, Media- &
Informatierecht (AMI) 6, 7 (2003) (critical to this "subjective" approach by noting that
this argument tends to be circular).
142. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, supra note
22, at para. 6.181-87; Ricketson, supra note 68, at 24; Gervais, supra note 20, at 18; Ficsor,
supra note 106, at 137.
143. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, supra note
22, at para. 6.173; Reinbothe & von Lewinski, supra note 70, at Art. 10 WCT no. 18.
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carries weight within the overall commercialization of works of the
relevant category and, consequently, belongs to the core of
copyright.
144
Whether additional aspects can be derived from the often
referred-to normative element of "normal exploitation" is still largely
unclear.145 In light of the fact that DRM systems enable the right
holder to exploit a work even on a pay-per-use basis, it is argued that
market failure considerations and decreasing transaction costs cannot
be the sole line of argument. Otherwise, generally accepted
restrictions, such as criticism, parody, or scholarship, could be argued
to contravene step two.
46
Applying these definitions to the proposals raises severe doubts
regarding their compatibility with the three-step test. The reason is
that the uses covered by the proposed non-voluntary license, i.e.,
copying and distributing content online by way of up- and downloads
or streaming, are a source of income today and will probably become
even more important in the future. Right holders increasingly
establish commercial platforms offering their content for download or
streaming.' 47 Assuming that a complete shift to commercial online
distribution by way of streaming is plausible at least for music and
perhaps motion pictures,' 8  even Senftleben's restrictive
interpretation, according to which a significant effect on the overall
commercialization of the work is necessary, would arguably conflict
with the second step. It thus appears as if non-voluntary licenses
covering noncommercial file sharing can hardly be considered to be in
line with the second criterion of the three-step test.
149
144. Senftleben, supra note 63, at 177-94.
145. See Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, supra
note 22, at para. 6.178 (holding that the normative approach to defining normal
exploitation includes "inter alia a dynamical element capable of taking into account
technological and market developments").
146. Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 50-51; Ricketson, supra note 68, at 25.
147. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2795-96 (2005) (Breyer,
J., concurring); Jeevan Jaisingh, Piracy on File Sharing Networks: Strategies for Recording
Companies (2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=567681.
148. For already existing commercial online ventures for music and motion pictures
see, e.g., http://www.apple.com/itunes/ (U.S.); http://www.movielink.com (U.S.);
https://www.eventim-music.de/wlbs/ (Germany); http://www.popfile.de/ (Germany).
149. This is also true in respect of Sobel's Digital Retailer Model, which aims at
preserving for the right holder the ability to set the rates for a download because setting
the price is only one feature of exclusivity apart from when, to what extent, and how (e.g.
via streaming or via download) an asset may be used by others. See Sobel, supra note 55.
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b. Normal Exploitation and Protection of Technological Measures
This conclusion, however, does not exhaust the problem. The
reason is that the aforementioned application of the three-step test
relies upon a new "type" of protection and factual exclusivity that
Stefan Bechtold called "copyright cast in silicon"'50 -i.e., DRM
systems. This technology enables right holders to launch commercial
services in the digital network environment. With the advent of
technological protection measures, the copyright owner not only
enjoys exclusivity based on the rights granted to her in national and
international copyright law, but DRM systems make it possible to
establish an additional, factual exclusivity supplemented with legal
protection against the circumvention of those measures.
151
As already indicated, contracting parties of the WIPO Copyright
Treaties are committed to providing legal protection of technological
measures and rights management information systems. 152 Are the
proposals in accordance with these international requirements?
Additionally, how does this legal protection relate to the
specifications of the three-step test?
(1) Rights Management Information
Regarding rights management information, most of the
proposals actually draw upon "fingerprinting" and "watermarking"
technologies. They do so in order to monitor the ongoing uses in p2p
networks for determining the shares of each right holder.' The
establishment of a levy/tax system thus benefits from, and relies upon,
the mandatory protection of rights management information systems
according to Art. 12 WCT. A violation of this treaty obligation is not
apparent.
(2) Technological Measures
Much more problematic in this context is the mandatory
protection of technological measures (Art. 11 WCT).A complete
prohibition of technological measures in national law would obviously
be in conflict with this requirement. Indeed, none of the proposals
discussed in this article suggests that.
150. STEFAN BECHTOLD, VOM URHEBER- ZUM INFORMATIONSRECHT 279 (2002).
151. See Art. 11, 12 WCT, 18, 19 WPPT; 17 U.S.C. Chapter 12; Copyright Directive,
supra note 59, at Art. 6, 7.
152. See Art. 11 WCT, 18 WPPT.
153. Supra Part III.B.
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Neil Netanel's "Noncommercial Use Levy," however, rests upon
the idea that all works are covered by the limitation/exception to
copyright and are thus lawfully available in p2p networks. This
promise can only be fulfilled if right holders do not have the
opportunity to withhold their works from this system. Consequently,
Netanel suggests that right holders would not be entitled to employ
technological DRM controls to block the privileged uses, or at the
very least, it would be legal for users to circumvent DRM controls
and for suppliers to distribute circumvention tools needed to engage
in privileged uses.'54 Would such a limitation of the legal protection of
technological protection measures be in accordance with the WIPO
copyright treaties?This raises the very fundamental question of how
this additional protection layer to copyright, 5' as regulated in Art. 11,
WCT relates to the three-step test (Art. 10 WCT), which historically
corresponded solely to exclusive rights granted by law.
Since both provisions are regulated in the same treaty, they must
not be construed separately. Adopting this view, it is certainly in
accordance with this treaty to provide for narrow
limitations/exceptions in line with Art. 10 WCT and to restrict the
legal protection of technological measures to the remaining (broad)
scope of exclusive rights. 6 For example, it would not be a violation of
the WCT to limit copyright regarding quotations and to allow a
person to circumvent a technological measure for the sole purpose of
copying a part of the work in order to make a quotation. Think about
incorporating sequences of movie A-which is available only on
154. Netanel, supra note 48, at 40. Sobel does not address this question expressly, but
it seems that his model is meant to comprise all copyrighted works and that it implies that
works can be downloaded, which would also require a prohibition of certain restrictive
technologies, e.g. those that facilitate pay-per-use models. See Sobel, supra note 55, at 683-
93. A different question is whether it would be in accordance with Art. 11 WCT for
national provisions to outlaw technological measures restricting even narrow limitations
which are not in conflict with the three-step test, for example the quotation right.
155. See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 1192, 1202
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq. do not establish a new, highly
protective alternative regime for copyrighted works and a new property right, but instead
prohibit forms of access that bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that the
Copyright Act otherwise affords as an additional protection layer).
156. Ficsor, supra note 71, at C11.10. This is the approach of the DMCA that gives
users a right to hack, but only under very restricted circumstances. See 17 U.S.C. §
1201(d)-(j) (2000). A draft bill of Sept. 2004 for an amendment of the Swiss Copyright
Act-Switzerland is not a member of the EU-would not prohibit acts of circumvention
done for the sole purpose of benefiting from a limitation to copyright. The draft is
available in German, French and Italian at http://www.ige.ch/E/jurinfo/ 103.shtm#1.
copy-protected DVDs-into movie B to comment on movie A's
statements.
15 7
But what about also applying a limitation/exception for non-
commercial file sharing to the anti-circumvention provisions as
Netanel suggests? Art. 11 WCT proclaims that contracting parties
shall provide adequate legal protection of effective technological
measures that restrict acts with respect to works not authorized by the
authors concerned or permitted by law. At first glance, it seems that
this wording would not require contracting parties to provide legal
protection for technological measures that restrict uses covered by
such a limitation/exception. The obligation under Art. 11 WCT does
not extend to acts permitted by law. Thus, if a national legislature
implemented a broad limitation/exception, e.g., for file sharing, that
country would consequently be free to confine the anti-circumvention
provisions accordingly. Obviously, this reasoning would open the
door for contracting parties to chip away at both legal and factual
exclusivity in the digital online environment, particularly regarding
file sharing.
This solution, however, would amount to a violation of
obligations under the WCT. As outlined above, a limitation/exception
for non-commercial file sharing would run afoul of the three-step test,
since the privileged p2p networks would compete with commercial
online ventures licensed by the right holders.158 This latter kind of
"hoarding" in cyberspace rests upon DRM. There is no indication
that this mode of exploitation may not be regarded as "normal"
under the three-step test. On the contrary, the WCT acknowledges
that the adoption of DRM is crucial for an exclusive exploitation in
cyberspace. This can be shown by the fact that it prohibits
circumvention of technological measures. Considering the possibility
of DRM-based pay-per-use business models, one could even argue
that any restriction to copyright contravenes the three-step test
because any use of the work forms part of this "normal"
exploitation.9 Even if one does not want to go that far, a combination
of a broad limitation/exception with limited legal protection of DRM
systems (i.e., circumvention is legal if done to engage in privileged
uses, e.g., noncommercial file sharing) or even a prohibition of
technological measures that restrict these permitted uses is not in line
157. For example, critics of Michael Moore considered making a point-by-point
rebuttal of his movie "Fahrenheit 9/11."
158. Supra Part IV.B.2.a.
159. See Koelman, supra note 141, at 7.
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with the three-step test and the mandatory protection of
technological measures.
This result, however, does not render all ideas for a levy/tax
system covering non-commercial file sharing unlawful. Accounting
for DRM systems when applying the three-step test might result in an
even greater freedom for contracting parties to structure their
national copyright law. The idea behind this consideration is that the
right holder obtains a new kind of exclusivity if she implements DRM
systems which eventually prevent the work from being used without
permission, for example "shared" online. There are now two
protection layers for a copyrightable work. The first one is exclusive
rights under copyright. The second one is the application of
technological measures and the legal rules against circumventing this
factual exclusivity. The legislature can limit both layers in parallel.
For example, national copyright law can limit exclusive rights and the
legal protection of technological measures with regard to quotations.
Both protection layers can, however, also be treated differently.
By "differently," I mean that national copyright law would, on the
one hand, grant nearly limitless anti-circumvention protection to
DRM systems in order to enable proprietary business models in
cyberspace (exclusivity/"hoarding"). On the other hand, a
limitation/exception would allow non-commercial file sharing under a
levy/tax system, provided that the right owner does not implement
DRM. The copyright owner would thus be free to choose which kind
of protection to adopt. With that freedom to choose, exclusivity as the
fundamental feature of current international copyright law is not
restricted by a statutory limitation/exception imposed by national law,
but voluntarily by the right holder herself. This is the basic notion of
the bipolar copyright system and the reason why this approach, if
implemented in national copyright law, would not be a violation of
the three-step test and the obligation to protect technological
measures.
One nevertheless has to consider some possible counter-
arguments in view of international copyright law. Art. 31(3)(b) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties proclaims that "there shall
be taken into account, together with the context ... any subsequent
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." An agreement
of the contracting parties regarding the permissibility of a "bipolar
system" cannot yet be observed. Broad non-voluntary licenses have,
until recently, only been accepted to the extent that the exercise of
exclusive rights is practically impossible (like in the case of private
A BIPOLAR COPYRIGHT SYSTEM
copying in the analog world). They have not been adopted in a
situation where the copyright owner simply refuses to implement
readily available enforcement mechanisms. '6° In addition, legal
protection of technological measures is dealt with only in the WIPO
Copyright Treaties, and not in the TRIPS Agreement. This may be
one reason why the WTO Panel has generally refused to consider the
failure of right holders to exercise their rights-due to a lack of
effective or affordable means of enforcement-when deciding what
constitutes normal exploitation.1
61
These arguments are, however, not persuasive. Many copyright
owners-e.g., small, startup record labels and single creators-do not
currently and most likely will not in the future adopt DRM to exploit
a work in cyberspace simply because it is too difficult or too
expensive. At the same time, modern technologies and p2p networks
enable these right holders to cheaply produce and publish their works
for a worldwide audience.12 Copyright law as the conventional
protection layer, however, cannot be enforced effectively to generate
sufficient income. Commercialization of works in cyberspace
therefore can be said to be impossible or extremely impractical for
these right holders. In acknowledging this problem, some authors
state that the three-step test actually obliges contracting parties to
impose a levy in order to compensate for the losses incurred by the
right holder if exercising the right is impossible.
63
Moreover, if the right owner-for whatever reasons-does not
implement restrictive DRM systems, but instead prefers to benefit
from a levy or tax for statutorily privileged uses in cyberspace, there
cannot be a conflict with the "normal," i.e., DRM-based exploitation.
P2P networks simply will not compete with proprietary business
models, because if applied, technology prevents the respective work
from being available at all in unrestricted p2p networks.'6 This
assumption, admittedly, will work only if technological measures
160. See supra Part III.A.
161. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, supra note
22, at para. 6.188.
162. This notion can be traced back to the digital dilemma stemming from digitization
and the Internet. See supra Part I.
163. See Ficsor, supra note 71, at C10.34; Sirinelli, supra note 20, at 28; Ricketson,
supra note 68, at 75; Netanel, supra note 48, at 60 n.199. With regard to the limitation for
private use under German law, see Martin Senftleben, Privates digitales Kopieren im
Spiegel des Dreistufentests, Computer und Recht (CR) 914, 919 (2003).
164. See, e.g., Senftleben, supra note 163, at 918 (arguing that the limitation for digital
private copying under German copyright law does not conflict with normal exploitation
because the right holder is free to implement DRM systems that restrict private copying).
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prevail over existing restrictions to exclusive rights. In other words,
any circumvention of technological measures must be prohibited,
even if the intended use is permitted by law. If the right holder
chooses exclusivity, this exclusivity has to be far-reaching, similar to
the provisions of current U.S. and European copyright law.'65 Only in
this case can the copyright owner effectively build a pay-per-use
business model on DRM systems.' 66 Additionally, only this approach
lets one expect that a work is technologically shielded from file
sharing. This approach is also fruitful with regard to the
interpretation of the WCT. A contracting party providing for
protection beyond the obligations established by Art. 11 WCT
regarding technological measures-because circumvention is also
prohibited if the intended uses fall under a limitation/exception to
copyright-may draw upon a more flexible interpretation of Art. 10
WCT regarding the three-step test compared to a contracting party
that goes for narrow limitations to/exceptions from both the legal and
the technological protection layer.
Finally, the three-step test is not geared towards single copyright
owners, but instead addresses national legislatures. The right holder
herself has always been free to decide to what extent she wants to
benefit from the exclusivity granted by law. This freedom is exactly
what the bipolar copyright system is founded on. The right holder
may opt for exclusivity and individual licensing ("hoarding"), but
under the bipolar copyright system, she has an additional option.
Under that system, she would also be able to earn a levy/tax share by
accepting certain privileges of users, in particular the non-commercial
use of her work in p2p file sharing systems.'67 Seen from this
perspective, the bipolar copyright system is nothing more than an
additional compensation mechanism to what is available today. At
present, the right holder may try to recoup her investment by
individually licensing the use of her work. File sharing is copyright
infringement. It is not compensated if the right holder does not
165. This far-reaching-"WCT-plus"-protection of technological measures was
adopted by the European Union and the United States. See Copyright Directive, supra
note 59, at Art. 6(4)(4). On the relationship between fair use and the anti-circumvention
provisions under U.S. law see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F.Supp. 2d 211,
219 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp. 2d 294, 322
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
166. With regard to European copyright law, see Peukert, supra note 105, at 25 et seq.
(explaining how the copyright directive expanded exclusivity to listening, reading, and
watching a work even if the consumer does not acquire a copy of the work).
167. On the lawfulness of the opt-in and opt-out alternatives, see infra Part
V.B.2.b.(3).
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enforce exclusive rights in difficult and expensive litigation in every
single case. Under the bipolar copyright system, these uncompensated
uses would potentially fall under the levy/tax system and would
generate income. It would be up to the right holder to decide which
compensation mechanism promises more revenues. Therefore, the
levy/tax system essentially is not a non-voluntary license, but instead,
it is a voluntary option. 6"
However, it must be stressed that this discussion relates to the
second step of the three-step test: the bipolar copyright system does
not conflict with normal exploitation of the work. Still, the
limitation/exception to exclusive rights under the levy/tax system has
to meet the requirements of the first 69 and third' 70 steps. This way, the
protection layer "copyright" may not be gouged completely. A
bipolar copyright system would have to be limited to certain special
cases (first step) and would have to be modeled in a way not to
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author (third step).
In summary, the bipolar system rests upon two pillars which
represent the layers of today's copyright protection. One pillar is the
law that prohibits the circumvention of technological protection
measures in order to establish exclusivity in the digital realm. The
other pillar is a limitation/exception that permits digital uses (e.g.,
non-commercial file sharing) in the case of the right holder not opting
for the "silicon copyright."'7 ' The model in accordance with the three-
step test is thus a levy/tax for non-commercial file sharing as an
alternative to exclusivity based on law and technology. As indicated,
this is the approach of William Fisher and Jessica Litman. According
to their concepts, the copyright owner is free to go for "hoarding"
instead of "sharing.',
172
Fischer and Litman suggest the levy/tax system as the statutory
default rule, thereby requiring the right holder to opt out of the
levy/tax system if she prefers a proprietary exploitation. The pros and
cons of this alternative and its compliance with international
copyright law treaties will be discussed in part W.73
168. On the differences to voluntary collective licensing as proposed by the EFF,
Daniel Gervais, and others, see EFF, supra note 50; Gervais, supra note 50; infra Part
V.B.3.b.
169. See supra Part IV.B.1.
170. See infra Part IV.B.3.
171. See Bechtold, supra note 150.
172. Litman, supra note 91, at 39-50 ("sharing" or "hoarding"); Fisher, supra note 1, at
248. For a more detailed discussion of the bipolar system, see infra Part V.
173. See infra Part V.
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3. Unreasonable Prejudice to the Legitimate Interests of the Right Holder
Before these details of the bipolar copyright system can be
addressed, one must still consider the third element of the three-step
test. This element requires that the limitation/exception must not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.
Only if a non-voluntary license overcomes the first two hurdles
must this last condition be assessed. It establishes a flexible standard
of reasonableness to balance the interests of right holders and the
beneficiaries of the restriction to exclusive rights."' It calls for
protection of interests that are "justifiable" in the sense that they are
supported by relevant public policies or other social norms.' The
crucial questions are whether the interests at stake are legitimate, and
at which point the degree or level of prejudice to the interests of the
right holder may be considered "unreasonable.', 7 6 The payment of
remuneration under a non-voluntary license may prevent the
prejudice from reaching an "unreasonable" level.'77
Deciding whether a levy/tax system covering p2p networks on a
non-commercial scale presents an unreasonable prejudice to the right
holder's interest depends, to a large extent, upon the architecture of
the system. It would obviously mean a prejudice to the right holder if
she were not allowed to technologically prevent file sharing or if
circumvention for the purpose of file sharing were not prohibited.
7 8
Relying on technological measures to exploit works online is a
legitimate interest of the right holder, 7 9 as that is just what Arts. 8, 10
and 11 WCT are meant to facilitate. Whether such an encroachment
upon the author's rights is seen as unreasonable depends on whether
national legislatures find that the public interests benefited by this
regime" are equal to the interests of authors,8' and whether the
174. Ficsor, supra note 106, at 145; Ricketson, supra note 68, at 27; Ginsburg, supra
note 20, at 57; Senftleben, supra note 63, at 210-44; Gervais, supra note 20, at 19-20.
175. Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, supra note
22, at para. 7.69; Gervais, supra note 20, at 19-20.
176. Senftleben, supra note 63, at 226-41.
177. German Federal Supreme Court, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht
(GRUR 963, 967 (2002); Reinbothe & von Lewinski, supra note 70, at Art. 10 WCT no.
23; Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 53; Senftleben, supra note 63, at 237-41.
178. This reflects Neil Netanel's proposal. See supra Part III.B.
179. In this regard, it is important whether only the interests of the author count or
also the interests of intermediaries as derivative right holders; see Reinbothe & von
Lewinski, supra note 70, at Art. 10 WCT no. 8 (safeguarding of investments of
intermediaries is an aspect to be considered in applying Art. 10 WCT); Senftleben, supra
note 63, at 216-21.
180. See supra Part III.C.
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tax/levy actually compensates for the losses. In that regard, it must be
observed that the third requirement remains open-ended, leaving it
for the national legislature to strike the balance in particular cases
that passed the first and second step.' 2 Considering the positive
effects of a levy/tax system for the dissemination of knowledge and
even for the compensation of the accruing uses, it could certainly be
argued that it would be a justified, and not unreasonable prejudice to
the interests of the right holder. The problem with a proposal that
restricts both protection layers-i.e., copyright and DRM plus anti-
circumvention provisions-with regard to file sharing is, however,
that it does not fulfill the requirements of the second step. 183 Neil
Netanel's concept, therefore, would not even make it to the third
step.
As explained above, a tax or levy system as an optional
alternative to exclusive exploitation in cyberspace does not run afoul
of the first two steps of the three-step test (bipolar system).
Regarding the third step, the beneficial effects of not outlawing p2p
technology, improving the dissemination of knowledge and
guaranteeing compensation for authors, justifies the adoption of this
system. The bipolar system does not limit exclusivity as such; it just
offers the right holder an additional business model to generate
income from the uses of her work in cyberspace. The mere necessity
to make a choice between the two alternatives cannot be said to be a
"prejudice" to the legitimate interests of the right holder because it is
nothing other than an everyday business decision. This fact again
illuminates the fact that limiting only one protection layer to a mere
remuneration right (i.e., copyright) and leaving the other layer
untouched (i.e., DRM plus anti-circumvention rules) is consistent
with international copyright law. In any event, the levy/tax revenue
has to be so high as to at least arguably substitute for a potential
exclusive exploitation on the basis of DRM in cyberspace.'
84
181. The dominant opinion prioritizes author's rights vs. user's interests. see e.g.
Guibault, supra note 63, at 90-110; Reinbothe & von Lewinski, supra note 70, at Art. 10
WCT no. 8 (referring to the preamble of the WCT that speaks of "rights of authors" but
only of the public "interest"); contra Geiger, supra note 63, para. 225-26 (regarding
limitations justified by fundamental rights); CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper
Canada, 2004 SCC 13 (Supreme Court of Canada 2004), para. 12, 48 (finding that fair
dealing is a right of users).
182. Ricketson, supra note 68, at 26.
183. See supra Part IV.B.2.
184. For a discussion of the amount of tax/levy due, see Fisher, supra note 1, at 205-15;
Netanel, supra note 48, at 44-52.
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C. Agreed Statement to Art. 10 WCT
The previous analysis reveals that it is more than doubtful
whether, for example, Neil Netanel's "noncommercial use levy" for
p2p file sharing complies with the requirements of international
copyright law, as it also denies the right holder the option of
individual licensing using DRM.A different view could be derived
from the agreed statement regarding Art. 10 WCT,185 which reads:
It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit
Contracting Parties to carry forward and appropriately
extend into the digital environment limitations and
exceptions in their national laws which have been
considered acceptable under the Berne Convention.
Similarly, these provisions should be understood to permit
Contracting Parties to devise new exceptions and liniitations
that are appropriate in the digital network environment.
6
The delegations that proposed this statement wanted to express
concerns that the three-step test might become a straightjacket for
adopting limitations and exceptions in the digital environment. 7 It is
worth noting the differences between the two sentences: whereas the
first sentence corresponds to already existing restrictions and the
digital environment in general, the second sentence, dealing with new
exceptions/limitations, relates to the digital network environment and
thus to the context addressed by this article. Does the statement thus
constitute a charter for contracting parties to devise new exceptions
and limitations in the digital network environment (i.e., the Internet)
without taking account of the three-step test?
For a number of reasons, the answer must be in the negative. It
was one of the main goals of the WCT to establish a new, exclusive
"Internet" right as a minimum right in international law. It would be
inconsistent with this purpose to read the statement as giving
contracting parties discretion to restrict exclusivity in the digital
network environment as they see fit. Had the contracting parties
wanted to exclude online uses from the three-step test, they would
have had to do so in the treaty. Finally, since the reproduction right is
also subject to Art. 13 TRIPS, which does not contain a similar
185. Since it applies to both paragraphs of Article 10 WCT, it not only relates to the
rights provided for in the WCT (especially the right of communication to the public, Art. 8
WCT), but also to the rights granted under the BC (the reproduction right).
186. For a discussion on the relevance of the agreed statements with regard to the
application of the three-step test in general, see Ricketson, supra note 68, at 62.
187. For the remarks of the delegations of the USA, Denmark, India, and the United
Kingdom, see Ficsor, supra note 71, at 5.137.
statement, this interpretation would produce a severe discrepancy in
international copyright law in general. Thus, the statement has to be
understood not as a broad enabling clause but as a clarification that
exceptions and limitations may indeed be adopted in the digital
network environment,"" and that they still are subject to the three-
step test.89
D. Comparison with European Copyright Regarding Digital Private
Copies
Finally, in evaluating the bipolar copyright system and its
compliance with international copyright law requirements, it is
interesting that its fundamental idea-to distinguish between the two
layers of protection of copyrightable works in the digital realm-has
already been taken up in European, especially German, copyright law
with regard to the limitation/exception for digital private copies."9 In
order to understand why, one has to read various provisions in
context.
1. The Two Protection Layers
Articles 2 and 3 of the Copyright Directive grant authors and
other right holders the exclusive rights of reproduction, of
communication to the public, and of making the protected subject
matter available to the public. 9' With those rights, every currently
known use of copyrightable subject matter on the Internet is
covered.' 92
Article 5 of the Copyright Directive contains a long list of
detailed limitations to or exceptions from those rights. In particular,
Art. 5(2)(b) Copyright Directive authorizes member states to provide
for a limitation/exception "in respect of reproductions on any
188. Ficsor, supra note 71, at C10.10 (correlating the statement to limitations and
exceptions justified specifically in view of the digital network environment, e.g. temporary
reproductions).
189. See Reinbothe & von Lewinski, supra note 70, at Art. WCT no. 33; Ficsor, supra
note 71, at C10.09; Sirinelli, supra note 20, at 42; Ricketson, supra note 68, at 63 ("If a
distinct regime for new limitations and exceptions is envisaged under the WCT, this would
need to be the subject of an express provision of that treaty").
190. See Alexander Peukert, Neue Techniken und ihre Auswirkung auf die Erhebung
und Verteilung gesetzlicher Vergtungsanspriche, Zeitschrift fur Urheber- und
Medienrecht (ZUM) 1050, 1051-53 (2003) (discussing German copyright law in that
respect); Alexander Peukert, DRM: Ende der kollektiven Vergiitung?, sic! 749 (2004)
(discussing Swiss copyright law).
191. See Sec. 16, 19a and 20 German CA.
192. See Art. 9, 11, llbis (1), llter(1) 14(1), 14bis(1) BC; art. 9(1) TRIPS; art. 8 WCT,
agreed statement concerning art. 1(4) WCT; art. 10, 14 WPPT.
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medium made by a natural person for private use and for ends that
are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, on condition that the
right holders receive fair compensation ...." The wording "any
medium" covers digital copies.1 93 The compensation is raised by a levy
on products that facilitate digital copying.94 This system relates to
copyright as the traditional protection layer.
Art. 6 Copyright Directive regulates technological measures as
the new and second protection layer. 95 Paragraph 1 of this provision
prohibits circumvention of technological measures. The interface of
DRM to the limitations/exceptions of copyright is laid down in Art.
6(4) Copyright Directive. It basically says that the anti-circumvention
protection trumps most limitations of copyright, including the one for
digital private copying. Thus, the right holder may impose technical
measures to prevent copying upfront.' Besides, she is not obliged to
193. See Copyright Directive, supra note 59, at recital 38 ("Digital private copying is
likely to be more widespread and have a greater economic impact. Due account should
therefore be taken of the differences between digital and analogue private copying and a
distinction should be made in certain respects between them."). Germany has chosen to
permit digital private copies. See Sec. 53(1) German CA. After thorough consideration,
the German government wants to stick with this originally only temporary decision from
2003. See Bill for a "Second Act on Copyright in the Information Society", supra note 21.
194. See Hugenholtz et al., supra note 64. For German copyright law, see Secs. 54-54h
German CA.
195. For a discussion of the legal protection of technological measures under the
Copyright Directive (supra note 59), see Severine Dusollier, Electrifying the Fence: The
Legal Protection of Technological Measures for Protecting Copyright, 21 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. (EIPR) 285 (1999); Terese Foged, U.S. v. E.U. Anti-Circumvention
Legislation: Preserving the Public's Privileges in the Digital Age?, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. (EIPR) 525 (2002); Thomas Heide, Access Control and Innovation under the
Emerging EU Electronic Commerce Framework, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 992 (2000);
Marie-Th6r~se Huppertz, The Pivotal Role of Digital Rights Management Systems in the
Digital World, 2002 COMPUTER L. REV. INT'L (CRi) 105; Kamiel Koelman, A HardNnut
to crack: The Protection of Technological Measures, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. (EIPR)
272 (2000); Kamiel Koelman, The Protection of Technological Measures vs. Copyright
Limitations, ALAI Congress Book 2001, 448; Kamiel Koelman & Natalie Helberger,
Protection of Technological Measures, in: P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ (ED.), COPYRIGHT
AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 165 (2000); Annemique de Kroon, Protection of Copyright
Management Information, in: P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ (ED.), COPYRIGHT AND
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 229 (2000); Jacqueline Lipton, Copyright in the Digital Age: A
Comparative Survey, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 333 (2001); Maria Martin-
Prat, The Relationship Between Protection and Exceptions in the EU "Information Society"
Directive, ALAI Congress Book 466 (2001); Karin Retzer, On the Technical Protection of
Copyright, 2002 COMPUTER L. REV. INT'L (CRi) 134; Jacques de Werra, The Legal
System of Technological Protection Measures under the WIPO Treaties, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, the European Union Directives and other National Laws
(Japan, Australia), ALAI Conference Book 198 (2001). For further references on German
literature see Alexander Peukert, Technische Schutzmafnahmen, in: ULRICH
LOEWENHEIM (ED.), HANDBUCH DES URHEBERRECHTS § 33 (2003).
196. See Tribunal de premiere instance de Bruxelles, L'ASBL Association Beige des
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make the necessary means available to enable the beneficiary of Art.
5(2)(b) to produce a digital private copy if the application of DRM
blocks this usage.7
Taken together, the "copyright" protection layer is limited with
regard to digital private copies to a mere right to remuneration under
a non-voluntary license. The "DRM plus anti-circumvention rules"
protection layer, however, stays intact. The right holder can achieve
nearly unlimited exclusivity on the condition that she applies
technological measures. This way, European copyright law on digital
private copying entails many features of the bipolar copyright system
for the digital network environment as proposed in this article. What
seems to be missing, however, is the freedom of the right holder to
choose between the two alternatives of exploitation, i.e., proprietary
exploitation based on DRM (blocking digital private copies) on the
one hand, and participation in the levy system (accepting digital
private copies) on the other.
2. The Freedom to Choose
In order to recognize that this option exists under European
copyright law on digital private copying, one has to take a closer look
at how the existing levy system is affected by the application of
DRM.If the right holder were to deploy technological measures and
thereby exploit her work under a private, proprietary system but
nevertheless benefit from the levy system, she would receive an
Consommateurs TestAchats v. EMI Belgium et al., Auteurs & Media 338 (2004) (holding
that there is no subjective right to private copying under Belgian copyright law). But see
Paris Court of Appeal, Recueil Dalloz, 1573 (2005)(stating that a technological measure
that prevents copying of a DVD violates the limitation for private copying under the
French Intellectual Property Code and that this violation is actionable by a consumer).
This decision overturned the decision of the Paris District Court, Perquin et al. v. SA
Films Alain Sarde et al., 36 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. (IIC) 148,152-
53 (2005) with comment by Christophe Geiger (holding that there is no subjective right to
produce a private copy and that therefore the implementation of copy protection
mechanisms on DVDs does not constitute a breach of the provisions on private copying,
L.122-5 and L.211-3 of the French Intellectual Property Code).
197. See Copyright Directive, supra note 59, at Art. 6(4)(2). The Copyright Directive
leaves open whether member states enforce the limitation for digital private copies against
the application of DRM. It follows from Art. 6(4)(4) that this freedom does not relate to
interactive uses on the Internet and thus not to file sharing. With regard to these uses, the
limitation for digital private copies may not be enforced in national law. For German law,
see Sec. 95b(1) no. 6a German CA. The decision of the Paris Court of Appeal, Recueil
Dalloz, 1573 (2005) dealt with a DVD and therefore with the limitation for private
copying in the offline realm. It expressly refers to the freedom of the EC member states to
enforce the limitation for digital private copying against technological measures under
Art. 6(4)(2).
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unjustified double compensation, because technology prevents the
permitted uses that justify the levy. By the same token, if many works
are commercialized exclusively by the right holder implementing
DRM, the amount of royalties raised under the levy has to be
lessened, since the extent of uses under this regime decreases."98
Otherwise, consumers would face increased prices for certain
products (e.g., CD writers, blank CDs) without being able to employ
these goods for private copying, which is perfectly legal under
German and European copyright law.
To avoid this problem of double compensation with regard to
digital private copying, two different approaches have been
submitted. Hugenholtz et al. suggest adjusting the levy system
according to the availability of respective technological measures.
After a finding that for a given media type or platform the application
of TPM's is, or soon is to become, economically viable, the
corresponding levy might be phased out, either gradually or at once.
Factors ('trigger points') to be considered in such a phase-out
procedure might include: upfront costs to producers and
intermediaries (i.e., DRM technology should be cheaply available to
SMEs); incremental costs or savings for consumers; consumer-
friendliness and acceptance, as reflected in, for example, the market
share; incorporation of PETs (Privacy Enhancement Technologies) in
DRM systems; accessibility of DRM protected content by disabled
users and users with special needs. '"Apparently, this proposal prefers
private exploitation. It is not meant to accomplish a permanent
coexistence of the private and the levy system, but to completely
phase out levies in the digital environment.
The other proposal-which is reflected in Art. 5(2)(b) Copyright
Directive and current German copyright law with regard to levies for
digital private copying2 -modulates the imposition and distribution
198. See Peukert, Neue Techniken and ihre Auswirkung auf die Erhebung und
Verteilung gesetzlicher Vergiitungsanspriiche, supra note 190, at 1053-54; Till Kreutzer,
Herausforderungen an das System der Pauschalvergatungen nach den §§ 54, 54a UrhG
durch die Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2001/29/EG, Zeitschrift fur Urheber- und Medienrecht
(ZUM) 1041, 1043 (2003).
199. Hugenholtz et al., supra note 64, at 44.
200. Peukert, Neue Techniken und ihre Auswirkung auf die Erhebung und Verteilung
gesetzlicher Vergiitungsanspriiche, supra note 190, at 1054-55; contra Hugenholtz et al.,
supra note 64, at 42-44. Section 13(4) of the Gesetz iber die Wahrnehmung von
Urheberrechten und verwandten Schutzrechten (German Law on the Administration of
Copyright and Neighboring Rights) (as amended on September 10. 2003) declares that
collecting societies, in drawing up tariffs for the levy, have to take into account to what
extent technological measures are being applied. For other European jurisdictions, see
Hugenholtz et al., supra note 64, at 45.
of levies according to the extent of actual application of DRM systems
in the respective digital field.2"' The fundamental features of this
concept can be summarized as follows. °2 Most important, one has to
distinguish the imposition of the levy from the distribution among
right holders. Starting with the distribution, right holders are obliged
to inform the competent authority (in Germany the competent
collecting society) when registering the work or when afterwards
applying DRM systems in the course of exploiting the work. When
such a notification is filed, the respective right holder is suspended
from the distribution process."' This system produces data that
describes the actual application of DRM in the market. These
datasets can be employed to determine how far the levy imposed on
products or services has to be adjusted. If the number of proprietarily
exploited works increases, the royalties imposed on specific devices or
mediums to which DRMs are regularly applied have to be reduced.
The reason is that the respective device can less often be utilized for
private copying of copyrighted works.2 °4
Obviously, this solution resembles core features of the bipolar
copyright system. In both cases, copyright law at the same time
provides for legal protection of technological measures and for
limitations to copyright accompanied by a levy. Technological
measures must not be circumvented, even if done for the sole purpose
of carrying out privileged uses under a limitation to copyright. Thus,
the copyright owner is enabled to establish proprietary and
technologically supported business models in the digital realm. If she
chooses to do so, however, she will not participate in the distribution
of the levy and may try to recoup her investment by individual
licensing. If not, digital private copies are not technologically
prevented up front. Copying in this case is lawful and indirectly
compensated via a levy.
201. Peukert, Neue Techniken und ihre A uswirkung auf die Erhebung und Verteilung
gesetzlicher VergUtungsanspriche, supra note 190, at 1055-58; Kreutzer, supra note 198, at
1044-45. The draft bill of the German Ministry of Justice on a "Second Act on Copyright
in the Information Society", supra note 21, at 20 et seq., expressly adopts this view.
202. For a detailed analysis of the system applied to existing levies for digital private
copies under German law, see Peukert, Neue Techniken und ihre Auswirkung auf die
Erhebung und Verteilung gesetzlicher Vergiitungsanspriiche, supra note 190, at 1055-58.
For an analysis of the existing levies for digital private copies under Swiss law, see Peukert,
DRM: Ende der kollektiven Vergutung?, supra note 190.
203. This is expressly laid down in the draft bill of the German Ministry of Justice on a
"Second Act on Copyright in the Information Society", supra note 21, at Sec. 54g (2)(2).
204. For example, CD writers could not successfully be used for reproducing
copyrighted content if most compact disks are copy protected.
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The major difference between the bipolar copyright system and
this already existing body of European copyright law is the type of
use to which these concepts apply. In Europe, especially Germany,
copyright issues revolve around digital private copies. This article and
the proposals discussed herein are devoted to non-commercial file.
sharing. Nevertheless, it can certainly be argued that if current
European copyright law is considered to be in line with the WIPO
Treaties-which is generally acknowledged 2°5-the bipolar copyright
system applied to p2p file sharing must be too.
E. Summary
This section discussed whether proposals for a levy/tax system
covering non-commercial file sharing are consistent with international
copyright law. The following conclusions can be drawn.
It is not even necessary to adopt a narrow interpretation of the
three-step test as applied by the WTO Panel decisions to discover
that those aforementioned proposals are not in accordance with the
three-step test, which do not give the right holder the option to
choose exclusivity on the basis of DRM.2 6 The reason for this
negative assessment is that all international conventions rest upon the
205. See Copyright Directive, supra note 59, at recital 15 The Community and a
majority of Member States have already signed the Treaties, and the process of making
arrangements for the ratification of the Treaties by the Community and the Member
States is under way. This Directive also serves to implement a number of the new
international obligations. The Copyright Directive is meant to implement the WIPO
treaties in EC law. See id. See also Paris Court of Appeal, Recueil Dalloz, 1573 (2005)
(holding that the limitation for digital private copies does not violate the three-step test
under the Berne Convention). But see Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Schutz gegen Umgehung
technischer Mafinahmen im Urheberrecht aus internationaler und rechtsvergleichender
Perspektive, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Internationaler Teil (GRUR
Int.) 1, 5 et seq. (2005) (arguing that the Copyright Directive violates the WCT because it
extends the protection of technological measures beyond the limitations of copyright).
206. See Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 55-56 ("Indeed, an exception for large-scale
'private' copying of the 'sharing' type might well conflict with a normal exploitation
(assuming the copyright could be enforced in this kind of situation)"); Reinbothe & von
Lewinski, supra note 70, at Art. 10 WCT no. 20 (applying strict scrutiny when it comes to
uses in the digital network environment), no. 22 ("[P]lacing of an entire protected work on
the digital networks for free access may unreasonably prejudice the author's interests to a
considerable degree."); Ricketson, supra note 68, at 80 ("[I]t is difficult to see any
justification that can be made for these uses under the three-step test"); but see Ficsor,
supra note 71, at C1O.34, C10.37; Eckersley, supra note 28, at 158 (concluding that the
three-step test "might just prove itself flexible enough to allow some limited
experimentation with virtual markets," although he acknowledges that the three-step test
"was devised as a mechanism to reinforce a model of copyright based in exclusive
rights."). Accordingly, Neil Netanel's "Noncommercial Use Levy" would actually require
the amendment of international copyright law. Nethanel, supra note 48.
perception that copyright is a private, exclusive right. Accordingly,
non-voluntary licenses are the exception to this rule, and they have to
be of a limited nature. °7 A broad levy system has never been accepted
as a true alternative to exclusive rights in the history of international
copyright law.2°8 This holds true also for the WIPO "Internet"
Treaties of 1996.2w
This conclusion, however, does not apply to a "bipolar copyright
system" regarding noncommercial file sharing, where the right holder
chooses between exclusivity based on technology and a right to
remuneration under a tax/levy regime.210 This kind of optional
levy/tax system corresponds to William Fisher's and Jessica Litman's
models.
However, even this result leaves many questions open. As Jessica
Litman correctly points out, "the devil will be in the details, and
focusing on the details allows us to figure out which ones are most
important. 212 Whereas it is beyond the scope of this article to address
all relevant aspects of a bipolar copyright system, the following part V
will bring up questions which will most likely bring on major criticism.
In particular, part V will explain in more detail how the two poles of
the system-proprietary exploitation and participation in the levy/tax
207. See ECJ, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Budojovick Budvar, nirodnf podnik, C-245-02,
04/11/16, at para. 65 ("With respect to the TRIPS Agreement, it should be observed that
the primary objective of that agreement is to strengthen and harmonise the protection of
intellectual property on a worldwide scale."); WILHELM NORDEMANN, KAI VINCK &
PAUL W. HERTIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS LAW Art.
9 BC no. 4 (1990); Panel Report, United States Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
supra note 22, at para. 6.97; Eckersley, supra note 28, at 158 ("The Berne three-step test
was devised as a mechanism to reinforce a model of copyright based in exclusive rights.").
For an application of the three-step test to Australian copyright law, see SAM RICKETSON,
THE THREE-STEP TEST, DEEMED QUANTITIES, LIBRARIES AND CLOSED EXCEPTIONS,
ADVICE PREPARED FOR THE CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT STUDIES LTD. (2002).
208. During the Stockholm Conference in 1967, a general compulsory license in favor
of the dissemination of knowledge was rejected. The latter had been proposed by India
and Romania to counterbalance for providing a general right of reproduction. See Report
Stockholm 1967, supra note 117, at 197; Ricketson, supra note 58, at 481. The Federal
Republic of Germany proposed an additional condition for exceptions, namely, that the
reproduction should not conflict with the author's right to obtain equitable remuneration.
See Report Stockholm 1967, supra note 117, at 196. See Ficsor, supra note 71, at 5.125-7
(remuneration schemes for private copying had also been discussed prior to the WIPO
conference in 1996, but did not make it onto the agenda of the conference).
209. See Ficsor, supra note 71, at 5.113-20, C10.33 (summarizing various statements
made at WIPO Symposiums in 1993, 1994, and 1995 that unanimously stress the notion of
copyright as an exclusive right in cyberspace).
210. See supra Part IV.B 2.b.
211. See supra Part III.B.
212. Litman, supra note 91, at 40.
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system-relate to each other and which alternative should be, or,
again in light of international copyright law, must be the statutory
default.
V. How a Bipolar Copyright System Would Function
A. Complexity of the System
A fundamental reservation against a bipolar copyright system for
the digital network environment will be its complexity."3 Even
without going into the details of how the freedom of the right holder
to choose between those two alternatives may be accomplished in
practice, it is obvious that it will involve considerable effort to
establish and organize the system. It is certainly true that there are
less complex answers to the digital dilemma."' For example, a shorter
term than life plus 50, or even 70, years would flush many works into
the public domain without significantly diminishing the incentive of
authors to create new works. A similar result could perhaps be
achieved by requiring registration for the renewal of the copyright
term.215
The problem with these proposals-which brings us back to the
aim of this article-is that they require the amendment or abrogation
of international copyright treaties.216 It has been pointed out that
these steps are extremely difficult to achieve or simply unrealistic on
a political level.217 It is therefore reasonable to modulate a solution
which is superior to the logjam currently in place without conflicting
with Berne, TRIPS or the WIPO Treaties. One proposal that fulfills
213. For a discussion on a necessary "new simplicity" in dealing with copyright, see
Stefan Bechtold, Das Urheberrecht und die Informationsgesellschaft, in RETO M. HILTY &
ALEXANDER PEUKERT (ED.), INTERESSENAUSGLEICH IM URHEBERRECHT 67, 84-86
(2004).
214. For the definition of the term "digital dilemma," see supra Part I.
215. See Breyer, supra note 1, at 323 et seq.; Lessig, supra note 57, at 251-52; William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
471, 476 (2003); Epstein, supra note 1, at 33-37; Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R.
2601 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?cl08:H.R.2601.
216. For the duration of copyright, see Art. 7 BC, 12 TRIPS. For the formalities of
copyright see Art. 5(2) BC.
217. See supra Part I. In the end, national lawmakers have to make a choice between
negotiations on a political level to amend international copyright law and systems like the
bipolar copyright system that do not require changes of international law. Complexity is
involved in either strategy. It only relates to different aspects, i.e., politics on the one hand
and the legal and technological architecture of the approach in line with current
international copyright law on the other (be it a bipolar copyright system or a streamlined
enforcement mechanism).
this fundamental requirement and looks for middle ground in the
battle over copyright in the digital network environment is a
streamlined enforcement mechanism as outlined by Lemley and
Reese." 8 Another option would be a voluntary collective management
system as suggested by the EFF and others.219 However, as long as
these solutions are not adopted and have proven that they actually
solve some of the problems they address, it is worth asking what a
bipolar copyright system would look like, despite its complexity.
B. Switching between Individual Licensing and the Levy System
1. Does the Choice Make Sense?
The most important feature of the bipolar system is that the right
holder may freely choose between exclusive, proprietary exploitation
on the basis of DRM ("hoarding") and participating in the levy/tax
system ("sharing") as regards non-commercial file sharing. One of the
advantages of this system is that the decision can and should be made
for every single subject matter by the copyright owner according to the
particular circumstances of each case. No governmental agency is
involved. It is thus a market-based, decentralized concept. To leave
the choice to the right holder recognizes self-determination as a core
value of copyright in general.
The following examples are meant to show that it makes sense to
provide for both alternatives in the digital online environment. In
doing so, one has to distinguish between two scenarios. Either the
choice will be made at the time of first publication of the work or the
copyright owner withdraws the work from one system and releases it
into the other after the time of first publication.
a. Decision at the Time of First Publication
A recognized artist who has already had some commercial
success may decide in favor of the proprietary system just as it is
today. Unauthorized use of her works in p2p networks infringes the
copyright in the works. To increase the risk that possible infringers
will actually face consequences, a streamlined enforcement procedure
as proposed by Lemley and Reese21 might be advisable.
218. Lemley & Reese, supra note 38. The authors also think it possible that their
proposed system could be part of a levy system, be it on an opt-in or opt-out basis. Id. at
1424.
219. See supra Part III.B.
220. Lemley & Reese, supra note 38.
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The situation is completely different if a newly created work
does not promise commercial success.22' This might be the case if the
author is not yet known in public222 or the work is geared at a very
small market for which there is not yet an intermediary offering
commercial distribution. Obviously, the author does not and cannot
expect significant revenue from choosing the proprietary system. She
will often not even find an intermediary who will agree to handle
commercial exploitation. In this situation, the levy/tax system will be
much more appealing. The work-once produced and ready for
distribution as a digital file in p2p networks-can be registered to be
eligible for distribution of the tax/levy.m It is then up to the author or
a commercial supplier of this service to promote the work among
potential consumers. To this end, the Internet and modern
technologies-especially preference-matching engines22-provide
promising tools for a cost-effective promotion, lowering the barriers
to entering the market. The interested user may download and
redistribute the work without being obliged to pay for every use
directly.225 Instead, the creator receives a share of the levy/tax
according to the use of his work as monitored by technology. Thus,
failing to get a contract in the entertainment industry does not
221. The distinction between popular works and less popular works also plays a role in
the discussion about the optimal level of DRM protection. See Jaisingh, supra note 147, at
19 (stating that "protecting the latest album by Michael Jackson or the latest Lord of the
Rings (movies and artists which already do, or are more likely to create a 'buzz') makes
more sense than protecting an album, which is less likely to be popular.").
222. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004)
("Indeed, the record indicates that that thousands of other musical groups have authorized
free distribution of their music through the internet."); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster
Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 (2005) ("Some musical performers... have gained new
audiences by distributing their copyrighted works for free across peer-to-peer
networks .... ).
223. For a discussion on the opt-in and opt-out alternatives, see infra Parts V.2, V.3.
224. See Lessig, supra note 57, at 132-34.
225. This is the approach of the so-called PotatoSystem, which was developed by the
German Company "4FO AG" together with the Fraunhofer-Institute for Digital Media
Technology IDMT in Ilmenau, Germany. Its concept is sketched on the website, Potato
System Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.potatosystem.com/info/eng/index.html,
as follows:
Authors of music aim at selling music. Therefore they have a substantial
interest in a wide distribution of their works (e.g. as MP3-files). However,
they care about making money as well. The PotatoSystem comes up with
an innovative solution to this problem. It was particularly developed for
unknown authors and independent music labels and operators of music
download portals. It is based on a commission model: the consumer
receives a commission for redistributing a music file. That means, within
the PotatoSystem, the user does not just pay for the right to hold a music
file but also for the right of redistribution.
automatically mean that you have to offer your work "for free."
Instead, you simply opt for the other business model and still have the
possibility to earn money with your creations. It should be added that
the levy/tax system could be attractive not only for newcomers or
artists who create works for markets too small to be served by
intermediaries of today. For example, a newly released album may be
promoted with a pre-released single which is registered for the
levy/tax system and then lawfully and unrestrictedly "shared" in p2p
networks. If the song proves successful, it can thereafter-together
with the rest of the album and additional material such as video
sequences-be exploited in the proprietary system.
b. Switch-Over from One System to the Other
The last example gives rise to the second scenario, which is much
more difficult to handle. Up to this point, this article has only dealt
with works which, at the time of first publication, are deliberately
channeled into the proprietary or the levy/tax system. Are there cases
imaginable where the copyright owner decides to switch from one
system to the other?
The first variant under that scenario is that the author initially
went for proprietary exploitation on the basis of DRM. If it has
become clear that there will not be additional, significant revenue
from exclusive exploitation-be it because consumers did not like the
work or because the commercial life cycle of the work has already
faded-the copyright owner can at least try to make some more
money by registering the work and making it freely available in p2p
networks.226 She is thereby able to reach consumers who are not
willing to pay for the song or other work on an individual basis. The
levy/tax system can thus form part of a strategy that relies on price
discrimination. 227 To offer the work for non-commercial file sharing,
not require direct payment for such uses, and still to make some
money is an alternative business model not available today.
226. The copyright owner may still try to sell copies of the work. While commercial
online ventures will face significant competitive pressure from the freely available versiens
in p2p networks, CDs and other offline mediums may still be successfully offered. See infra
Part V.B.3.c.
227. There is no considerable risk that consumers will willfully abstain from
purchasing or licensing copies of newly released songs or movies because they hope that
these works will soon be available in p2p networks. The reason is that cultural works exert
considerable attraction on consumers if they are-admittedly, for a limited period of
time-a "must-have." Think, for example, of number one hits or movies that consumers
simply have to know in order to be able to take part in everyday conversation. This notion
relates particularly to younger consumers.
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Moreover, the fact that this switch to the levy/tax system will often
take place after a certain period of proprietary exploitation reflects
current criticism regarding the copyright term. In many jurisdictions,
copyright currently lasts 70 years post mortem auctoris.228 It is rightly
argued that such a long copyright term-compared to a copyright
term of 50 years p.m.a. or an even shorter term-does not generate
relevant economic incentives to become creative in the first place.229
As justice Breyer stated in his dissenting opinion in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, "no potential author can reasonably believe that he has
more than a tiny chance of writing a classic that will survive
commercially long enough for the copyright extension to matter.
After all, if, after 55 to 75 years, only 2 percent of all copyrights retain
commercial value, the percentage surviving after 75 years or more (a
typical pre-extension copyright term)-must be far smaller., 230 The
bipolar copyright system can be understood as a flexible answer to
that problem. Releasing works into p2p networks after an initial
exploitation in proprietary systems gives users nearly as much
freedom as with works in the public domain. Besides, to provide for a
significantly shorter copyright term would again require the
amendment of international copyright law.231 Finally, no statutory
modification of the copyright term would ever make it possible to
consider each commercial life cycle of a given work individually. This,
however, is just what the bipolar copyright system does.
At first glance, it seems that the second variant-that is, to switch
from the levy/tax system to the proprietary system-will not likely be
of practical relevance. After all, there are digital files of the work not
protected by DRM available in p2p networks. Taking the current
state of the art, it will hardly be possible to technologically prevent
further use of these files. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Grokster,
however, offers a telling example which teaches the opposite.
Explaining why the p2p software at issue was "capable of substantial"
or "commercially significant noninfringing uses," the court
proceeds:
232
228. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000); Art. 1(1) Council Directive 93/98, 1993 OJ (L290)
9-13 (EC).
229. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 792-93 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at
808 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
230. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 808 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Lessig, supra note 57, at 292-94.
See Reto M. Hilty, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Die Schutzfrist im Urheberrecht-eine Diskussion,
die auch Europaier interessieren sollte, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht
International (GRUR Int.) 201 (2003) (providing a European perspective on Eldred).
231. See Art. 7 BC; art. 12 TRIPS.
232. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004). The
One striking example provided by the Software Distributors
is the popular band Wilco, whose record company had
declined to release one of its albums on the basis that it had
no commercial potential. Wilco repurchased the work from
the record company and made the album available for free
downloading, both from its own website and through the
software user networks. The result sparked widespread
interest and, as a result, Wilco received another recording
contract.
Thus, experience shows that proprietary exploitation is not at all
eliminated if the respective work had already been available in p2p
networks in an unprotected digital format. The strategy to exclusively
commercialize such works may become even more promising under
the bipolar copyright system. First, the proprietary system could be
strengthened by an improved enforcement system on the Internet in
order to deter users from further "sharing." 3 Second, the monitoring
technology which helps to count lawful uses in p2p networks... may
also be employed to curtail file sharing. For example, one could
imagine an automatic indication that the work is no longer available
for "free" if a user wants to stream or download the work after the
withdrawal. It should be added in this context that one important
consequence of the differentiated approach of the bipolar copyright
system may well be that consumers will be more likely to respect
copyright enforcement if it applies only to commercially valuable
works, and not to possibly any content available. In any event, it is
up to the copyright owner to take the risk. Again, new business
models and improved offers (for example additional versions of a
song, etc.) may help to make this strategy valuable. 36
Supreme Court did not refer to this example expressly but stated that "some musical
performers. .. have gained new audiences by distributing their copyrighted works for free
across peer-to-peer networks...." MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,
2772 (2005). Justice Ginsburg declared "there has been no finding of any fair use and little
beyond anecdotal evidence of noninfringing uses." Id. at 2785 (Ginsburg J., concurring).
233. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 38.
234. See supra Part I.
235. Litman, supra note 91, at 49.
236. One could even consider allocating, for a certain period of time, a fraction of the
money due under the levy/tax system to the copyright owner after the work has been
withdrawn to account for the ongoing uses. This option, however, has severe legal pitfalls.
In the end, the uses are unlawful. After the work has been withdrawn, uploads and
downloads infringe the copyright in the work. They can be prevented by exercising
exclusive rights. If the copyright owner fails to do so, it does not seem justified to
nevertheless assign her shares of the levy/tax revenue.
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These examples show that both systems will be used for different
classes of works. While some works will be exploited-often for a
limited time only-in commercial online ventures, others will from
their publication on be available for non-commercial file sharing in
p2p networks.The question still open is, however, which system
should or must form the legal default. Two alternatives are
imaginable. Either the levy/tax system is the legal default and the
copyright owner has to opt out of it (this is the variant proposed by
Jessica Litman and William Fisher), or exclusivity is the rule and the
right holder may deliberately opt into the levy/tax system. The
following section addresses both alternatives, again emphasizing the
question of whether both approaches are in line with international
copyright law.
2. Opting Out of the Levy/Tax System
a. Features and Benefits
The first alternative to be considered here is the opt-out model.
According to Jessica Litman's and William Fisher's suggestions, the
levy/tax system should be the legal default.237 Thus, any work still
under copyright and every newly published work would fall under the
new limitation from or exception to exclusive rights and would at the
same time be eligible for shares of the levy/tax, unless the right holder
opts for exclusivity on the basis of DRM. With regard to new works,
Litman proposes a notice-based opt out mechanism. In order to
inform consumers that a particular work does not fall under the
levy/tax system, the copyright owner would have to release the work
in a certain DRM format."' She would lose any claims under the levy
system. Additionally, she would have to take affirmative steps to
exclude her work from the network and "enable consumers to quickly
and painlessly ascertain that those works may not lawfully be
shared."23 9 As concerns works that have already been released in
another, free format, Litman would make it even more burdensome
to withdraw a work from "sharing."2" Without explaining how the
237. See Litman, supra note 91, at 45 et seq; Fisher, supra note 1.
238. Litman, supra note 91, at 46-47.
239. Id. at 45.
240. See id. at 48:
All owners of the copyright in the work, as well as the work's creators,
would be required to join in the decision to withdraw. First, the copyright
owners would need to recall copies of the work released in formats other
than *.drm, and offer any consumers who own authorized, commercial
copies in a non°*.drm format the opportunity to swap those copies for
implementation of technological measures and privileged uses under
the alternative compensation system relate to each other, Fisher
would accept it if a copyright owner "opted out of the tax system
entirely, releasing only an encrypted version of his or her
recording.""2 '
Obviously, this concept aims at encouraging "sharing" instead of
"hoarding." '242 It thus relies on the positive effects of the levy/tax
system as summarized above.243 Moreover, it accepts the fact that
virtually every work published today can be accessed in p2p networks
and that many works are not commercialized and released for free on
the Internet.2" If "sharing" is the default today, Litman concludes that
it should be the default of tomorrow. It would simply be transformed
from illegal to lawful and compensated use. One final aspect should
not be underestimated: a tax or levy system would be imposed on
services and devices in use for file sharing upfront. It would not be
collected on an individual basis, as under a collective license where
the user or the facilitator has to pay according to the number of works
actually being used or at least available for use in the network. 245 The
imposition of a levy/tax high enough to generate funding that
encourages authors to go for the levy/tax system can hardly be
justified if there are only very few works registered for lawful use in
p2p networks. The opt-out model would make sure that
presumptively all copyrighted works are legally available for up- and
download. It would thus provide the prospect of something of value
for the society at large. Without this prospect, there will be strong
*.drm copies at no charge. Second, the law should incorporate a 24-month
grace period before any withdrawal of a work could take effect. (In the
meantime, withdrawn works could collect payments from the common
fund.) Finally, in order to recover in an infringement suit for consumer-to-
consumer dissemination of a withdrawn work, the copyright owner would
need to show knowledge that the work had been withdrawn.
241. Fisher, supra note 1, at 247-48.
242. Litman, supra note 91, at 41; Fisher, supra note 1, at 237.
243. See supra Part III.C.
244. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004)
("Indeed, the record indicates that that thousands of other musical groups have authorized
free distribution of their music through the internet."); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster
Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 (2005) ("Some musical performers.., have gained new
audiences by distributing their copyrighted works for free across peer-to-peer
networks.... "). See also MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2789 (2005)
(Breyer J., concurring) (explaining the significant future market for noninfringing uses of
Grokster-type peer-to-peer software).
245. Fisher, supra note 1, at 252. For the differences in financing between voluntary
collective licensing and a levy/tax, see infra Part. V.3.b.
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resistance against the adoption of a levy/tax system as a mere
alternative to exclusive exploitation.
b. Compliance with International Copyright Law
Again however, there are severe doubts whether this concept is
in accordance with international copyright law, basically for two
reasons.
(1) Overview
First, one could ask whether exclusivity as only the secondary
option is still in line with the three-step test. As already outlined, the
bipolar copyright system as such arguably complies with this treaty
obligation because it simply offers the right holder an additional
business model. Exclusivity in cyberspace is limited only with regard
to copyright as one of the two layers of exclusivity. The other one, i.e.,
exclusive exploitation based on DRM systems, remains unaffected. 46
What remains uncertain, however, is whether exclusivity has to be the
legal default under the three-step test.
Second, if the right holder has to opt out of the levy/tax system in
order to enjoy full exclusivity, it could be said that this model
establishes a formality requirement.247 Article 5(2) BC reads "The
enjoyment and exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any
formality ...." The formulation "these rights" refers to paragraph 1
of Article 5 BC, which proclaims that "authors shall enjoy, in respect
of works for which they are protected under this Convention, in
countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights
which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their
nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this
Convention. ,
248
246. See supra Part IV.B.2.b.
247. See Litman, supra note 91, at 46 n.166.
248. Historically, the acts of the Berne Convention moved away from formality
requirements for copyright protection. Article 2(2) of the 1886 act provided that "the
enjoyment of these rights shall be subject to the accomplishment of the conditions and
formalities prescribed by law in the country of origin of the work ...." It was only at the
1908 Berlin Conference that this requirement was abolished. Article 4(2) BC 1908 already
had the same wording as Art. 5(2) of the current version. The 1967 Stockholm Conference
simply rearranged the legal material in Arts. 4 to 6. It did not alter Art. 4(2) but simply
gave it a new number, Art. 5. See Ricketson, supra note 58, at 5.82; Fritz Schonherr, On
the Interpretation of Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, Taking as an Example the Greek
Antipiracy Law of July 15, 1980, Copyright 295-97 (1981); Alfred Baum, Berner
Konvention, Landesgesetze und internationals Privatrecht, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und
Urheberrecht (GRUR ) 923-27 (1932).
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Since both the TRIPS Agreement and the WCT stipulate that
contracting parties have to comply with Articles 1 to 21 of the Berne
Convention, the prohibition of formalities has to be observed by
parties to these treaties too.2 9 An alleged violation of this obligation
is consequently enforceable in a WTO dispute settlement
proceeding. Moreover, these references entail that not only the
right of reproduction according to Art. 9 BC must not be subject to
formality requirements, but also the right of communication to the
public, including the right of making works available to the public
under article 8 WCT.251 These rights are minimum rights granted by
the Berne Convention and the WCT. They are thus "rights specially
granted" under these treaties, so their enjoyment or exercise must not
be subject to formalities.252 In order to establish a levy/tax system
where "sharing" is the legal default rule, however, the right of
reproduction and the right of communication to the public would be
limited with regard to non-commercial file sharing unless the right
holder accomplishes certain requirements.
25 3
The three-step test and the prohibition of formalities are closely
related to each other. If exclusivity has to be the default under the
three-step test, the opt-out mechanism can well be said to be a
formality requirement. If not, the right holder would in principle
254
enjoy automatic protection under the levy/tax system without further
conditions or formalities. In this latter case, Art. 5(2) BC would not
be opposed to this solution. To explain this distinction, one has to rely
on the general goals of the convention and the provisions relevant
here because there is no precedent for an opt-out mechanism under a
bipolar copyright system. The idea of two layers of exclusivity which
are treated differently was not known in 1971, the year of the last
amendment of the Berne Convention.
(2) Formalities
To begin with, it can certainly be argued that the necessary acts
for opting out of the levy/tax system are formalities under 5(2) BC.
249. See Art. 9 (1) TRIPS (excluding Art. 6bis BC), Art. 1(4) WCT.
250. See supra Part I.
251. These are the exclusive rights that would have to be limited in order to establish a
levy/tax system. See supra note 116.
252. Nordemann et al., supra note 207, at Art. 5 BC no. 6.
253. See supra Part III.B.
254. It has to be noted that naturally only those right holders can receive a share of the
incurred levy/tax who register their work with the competent authority that distributes the
money. See infra Part V.B.2.b.(3).
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Jessica Litman suggests that the work would have to be published in a
certain DRM format and that the right holder would have to take
care that consumers are informed about this choice.255 One could
alternatively imagine a notice with the competent authority that the
work shall not be lawfully available for file sharing.2 56 Both
requirements are state-required, formal preconditions, just as the
notice and registration system under former U.S. copyright law, which
was one of the major obstacles for the U.S. joining the Berne
Convention.257 This is obvious in the case that a declaration or
registration is necessary.258 It also holds true for the need to use a
DRM format. While one might question whether this requirement is
a "formality," it certainly can be said to impose a "condition" in a
more general sense that has to be complied with in order to ensure
that the work does not fall under the limitation/exception for non-
commercial file sharing. Originally, article 2(2) of the 1886 Berne act
referred to formalities and conditions. 2 9 "Conditions" meant material
requirements such as providing a translation of the work in the
language of the country where protection was sought.2'6 When the
need to comply with conditions and formalities was abolished at the
1908 Berlin Conference, the term "conditions" in the new provision
4(2) was also deleted. The documents of the conference, however,
show that the delegations understood the new wording "formalities"
as covering both the "conditions and formalities" referred to in the
1886 act.26 ' Thus, the requirement to use a certain format for
publication in order to enjoy exclusivity in cyberspace is also a
"formality" under Article 5(2) BC.
262
255. See supra Part III.B.
256. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 242 (discussing an opt-out mechanism as regards the
preparation of derivative works).
257. See 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2000); Nordemann et al., supra note 207, at Art. 5 BC no.
7; Leaffer, supra note 65, at § 12.5[B][1].
258. Other formalities are the obligation to affix a copyright symbol and to make a
legal deposit of money or a copy of the work under penalty of losing rights. See Daniel
Gervais, Application of an Extended Collective Licensing Regime in Canada: Principles
and Issues Related to Implementation, Study prepared for the Department of Canadian
Heritage 19 (2003), http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pda-
cpb/pubs/regime/regime-e.pdf; Ricketson, supra note 58, at 5.83; Nordemann et al., supra
note 207, at Art. 5 BC no. 7.
259. For the development of the wording of this article, see supra note 248.
260. ERNST ROTHLISBERGER, DIE BERNER OBEREINKUNFT ZUM SCHUTZE VON
WERKEN DER LITERATUR UND KUNST UND DIE ZUSATZABKOMMEN 101 (1906).
261. Ricketson, supra note 58, at 5.83.
262. The same holds true for other requirements Litman proposes. See Litman, supra
note 91, at 48.
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(3) Effect on the Enjoyment or Exercise of Rights
With this insight, however, the interpretation of Art. 5(2) BC is
not complete. The second element of this provision is that the
enjoyment or exercise of the right of reproduction and the right of
communication to the public as minimum rights under the named
conventions are subject to the formality. The necessity to address this
element separately becomes obvious in light of a statement at the
Diplomatic Conference of 1884 which explains the meaning and reach
of the provision. During the discussion, one of the German delegates
put forward an interpretation which was approved by the Conference
and was reproduced verbatim in the Conference records. According
to this statement of Dr. Meyer, "the words 'formalities and
conditions' comprise everything which must be complied with in
order to ensure that the rights of the author with regard to his work
may come into existence [in German: "Voraussetzungen"], while the
effects and consequences of protection [in German: "Wirkungen"], in
particular the extent of that protection, should remain subordinated
to the principle of treatment equal with nationals. '2 63 As was already
shown, the current version of Art. 5(2) BC can be traced back to Art.
2(2) of the 1886 act.2'6 Hence, the distinction between prohibited
formalities relating to the genesis of the right and formalities that
concern only the scope of copyright is still valid for the interpretation
of the provision.
Adopting this reading of Art. 5(2) BC, it could be argued that
the opt-out mechanism establishes only a formality requirement as
regards the scope of copyright, in Dr. Meyer's words the consequences
of protection, but not its genesis. As a result, these formalities would
not fall under Art. 5(2) BC and would therefore not conflict with this
international obligation. It is, for example, held that Art. 5(2) BC
does not apply2" to provisions in national copyright law that grant a
longer copyright term for pseudonym works if the author registers her
true name in a register for authors267 or if the law provides for a
263. Ricketson, supra note 58, at 5.82.
264. See supra Part V.B.2.b.(2).
265. See Ricketson, supra note 58, at 5.83; Masouy6, supra note 137, at 35; Nordemann
et al., supra note 207, at Art. 5 BC no. 7; see also Baum, supra note 248, at 927 (providing
further references).
266. See Ricketson, supra note 58, at 5.82; Rothlisberger, supra note 260, at 108;
Baum, supra note 248, at 928; WILLY HOFFMANN, DIE BERNER UEBEREINKUNFT ZUM
SCHUTZE VON WERKEN DER LITERATUR UND KUNST 92 (1935); Schonherr, supra note
248, at 297.
267. See, e.g., Sec. 66(2) German CA.
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presumption in favor of the person who is designated as author on a
copy of the work.2" Similarly, the opt-out mechanism does not
deprive the author of copyright protection completely. Copyright still
comes into existence without any formalities. Only with regard to
non-commercial file sharing is the legal default not exclusivity, but a
levy/tax system that, after all, generates income for the author. True,
the copyright owner still has to register her work with the competent
authority in order to actually have the prospect of receiving a share of
the accrued money. But this could be said to be a mere factual
necessity;169 it is not required by law. Basically, the protection under
the levy/tax system is afforded without any formalities. Moreover, it
has to be kept in mind that the bipolar copyright system is generally
admissible under the three-step test.70 A national copyright law
establishing this model could thus be said to grant authors the
minimum rights under Berne. If this is true, both pillars of the bipolar
system are valid default rules. Art. 5(2) BC would only prohibit both
layers of protection being subjected to formalities. Therefore, if the
right holder opts for exclusivity, she would, according to this view,
only extend the scope of copyright protection, just like the author of a
pseudonym work who registers her true name to enjoy the full
copyright term.
Finally, the formalities proposed for opting out of the levy/tax
system do not relate to the exercise of the exclusive rights. With
exercise, Art. 5(2) BC refers to the enforcement of copyrights, i.e., to
the remedies available in the case of an infringement. For example,
the bringing of proceedings or the award of damages must not be
268. See, e.g., Sec. 10(1) German CA:
In the absence of proof to the contrary, the person designated in the
customary manner as the author on copies of a work which has been
published or on the original of a work of fine art shall be deemed the
author of the work; the same shall apply to a designation which is known as
the author's pseudonym or the artist's mark.
269. For a discussion of the contrary view and the duty of the competent authority to
search for authors who did not register, although their works are being shared, see infra
note 282. It is furthermore interesting in this context that the "extended collective
management" of exclusive rights by collecting societies is said to be in line with Art. 5(2)
BC. Extended collective management of rights means that national copyright law entails a
presumption in favor of collecting societies. According to this presumption, all authors
grant rights, even if this is true only for a substantial number of authors, but not for all
authors whose works are actually used under the collective licensing scheme. The
background is that without this presumption, smaller collecting societies would not be able
to offer a comprehensive repertoire for users. Authors are therefore obliged to expressly
object to this administration of their rights in order to regain control over the exercise of
their exclusive rights. See Gervais, supra note 258, at 19; Gervais, supra note 11, at 72.
270. See supra Part IV.E.
A BIPOLAR COPYRIGHT SYSTEM
dependent on formalities or conditions. 27' The formalities at stake
here do not center on infringement and remedies, but primarily on
the enjoyment of rights. Additionally, the whole idea of a bipolar
copyright system stringently implies a choice to be made by the right
holder. This choice has to be expressed and registered in some form
to give the public or at least the competent authority notice about the
status of the work. If "exercise" of rights were to cover this
notification, even a system that starts from exclusivity and provides
for a voluntary opt-in mechanism as regards the levy/tax system
would not comply with Art. 5(2) BC. Respectively, the requirement
to file written documents in order to institute an infringement
proceeding would run afoul of the Berne Convention. Obviously, this
cannot be true. A formality requirement as to the exercise of rights
has to impose additional obstacles not necessarily inherent in the
copyright system.
For the following reasons, these arguments in favor of an opt-out
mechanism are unconvincing.First and most important, it must be
reiterated that the bipolar copyright system is also subject to the
three-step test. It only helps to avoid a conflict with the second step,
i.e., the normal exploitation of the work in the digital network
environment. The first and third steps still have to be observed.272
From this it follows that a bipolar copyright system has to be confined
to certain special cases (non-commercial file sharing) and that the
levy or tax has to compensate the privileged uses in order not to cause
an unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the right
holder. If it is true that the three-step test applies, its primary purpose
has to be observed. And this fundamental goal is to guarantee certain
minimum exclusive rights in works and to confine the scope of
limitations to or exceptions from exclusive rights in national copyright
law. 273 The bipolar copyright system already downgrades exclusivity to
an alternative, on a par with a mere right to remuneration under a
levy/tax system. This right to remuneration relies on
limitations/exceptions to copyright which would conflict with the
normal exploitation of the work if the copyright owner did not have
the option to choose exclusivity.274 A paradigm shift like this only
conforms with the purpose of the three-step test if exclusivity at least
forms the statutory default rule.
271. Ricketson, supra note 58, at 5.84.
272. See supra Part IV.B, I.E.
273. See supra Part IV.E.
274. See supra Part IV.B.2.b.
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Second, this consideration can be rested upon the evaluation of
other cases where the copyright owner is obliged to fulfil formalities
in order to enjoy exclusivity. One example can be found in the BC
itself. Art. 10bis (1)(1) reads:
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the
Union to permit the reproduction by the press, the
broadcasting or the communication to the public by wire of
articles published in newspapers or periodicals on current
economic, political or religious topics, and of broadcast
works of the same character, in cases in which the
reproduction, broadcasting or such communication thereof is
not expressly reserved [emphasis added].
The emphasized qualification enables the right holder to avoid
the limitation. In order to enjoy exclusivity, she has to expressly
reserve her rights. Under German copyright law, the statement "all
rights reserved" has to be expressed in connection with every single
published article.275 Obviously, this solution greatly resembles the
bipolar copyright system, and particularly with the opt-out model as
proposed by Jessica Litman. Ricketson and other commentators,
however, reason that Art. 10bis (1) BC contains a formality
requirement in that the genesis of the exclusive right at stake depends
upon making an express reservation.2 6 It is thought to be justified
only because it is acknowledged in the convention itself as a lex
specialis to Art. 5(2) BC.2 7 Another situation similar to the opt-out
model is mandatory or extended collective licensing, where the
author has to withdraw her rights from the collecting society in order
to handle her rights individually. Again, the author has to make a
declaration or has to fulfill other conditions to enjoy exclusivity.
However, mandatory collective licensing is found to be in conflict
with the three-step test already if it pertains to exclusive rights278 or at
any rate if the collecting society is required by law to grant
exploitation rights or authorizations to any person so requesting.279
275. See Ferdinand Melichar in GERHARD SCHRICKER (ED.), URHEBERRECHT, Sec.
49 German CA no. 10.
276. Hoffmann, supra note 266, at 91.
277. Ricketson, supra note 58, at 5.85.
278. See Schonherr, supra note 248, at 295 with further references; Nordemann et al.,
supra note 207, at Art. 5 BC no. 77.
279. This is the case according to the German "Law on the Administration of
Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Copyright Administration Law)." According to Sec.
11 of the Copyright Administration Law, "[C]ollecting societies shall be required to grant
For in the latter case the exclusive rights are in fact reduced to a mere
right to remuneration administered by a collecting society.m This,
however, is exactly the case under the opt-out model where
participation in the levy/tax system is the statutory default. Taken
together, these examples illuminate the fact that the Berne
Convention has been interpreted as requiring national copyright laws
to vest the author with exclusive rights as the statutory default rule. A
diverging subsequent practice in the application of the treaty cannot
be ascertained.28
Finally, it should be added that the right holder has to register
her work with the competent authority in order to actually participate
in the levy/tax system. Thus, even the statutory default under the opt-
out model requires compliance with formalities.282
c. Summary
In Summary, the opt-out model as suggested by Jessica Litman
and William Fisher is a state-required formality for the enjoyment of
minimum exclusive rights. It is thus not in line with Art. 5(2) BC. The
reason is that international copyright law persists in the notion of
exclusive rights, even in the digital network environment. These
exclusive rights have to come into existence without further
formalities as the statutory default. To provide for exclusivity only
under the condition that the right holder opts out of a levy/tax system
does not meet this requirement.
The only way to go forward would be to confine the opt-out
approach to works for which the respective country (for example the
exploitation rights or authorizations to any person so requesting on equitable terms in
respect of the rights they administer."
280. See von Lewinski, supra note 76, at 5:
The mandatory collective administration however does not affect the
exclusive right itself; the covered uses are not authorized by law.
Rather, the author is only restricted in the options of exercising the
right: he is left with the only possibility to exercise the exclusive right
through the collecting society, whereas the right itself is not limited as
such, in particular not in favor of any such interest of the public at
large.
Contra Gervais, supra note 11, at 72.
281. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31(3)(b) May 23, 1969 n.55
U.N.T.S.331.
282. In order to address this problem, the authority distributing the money would have
to check whether all works that are being used are registered and would have to contact
the respective right holders if this were not the case. This solution obviously entails
significant administration costs that diminish the prospects of the whole system.
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U.S.) is the country of origin as defined in Art. 5(4) BC, 3 because the
obligation to provide for certain minimum rights and the formality
requirement of Art. 5(2) BC do not apply in this situation." Such a
limited adoption of the opt-out model, however, would not seem to
be reasonable from a practical point of view. First publication
determines the country of origin of a work. Right holders could easily
evade the system if they published the work in another country than,
for example, the U.S., for the first time. Users of p2p networks could
not be sure whether the work they were using was lawfully available
in the network even if it was not in a DRM format because it could
still be a foreign work, which does not fall under the system anyway.
The opt-out model as such would lose its most important prospect,
i.e., that the levy/tax system covers presumptively all works available
in the network. Finally, it would be even more difficult to persuade
the legislature to implement a general levy/tax up front if the
amendment discriminates against national authors as compared to
foreigners."'
283. Litman, supra note 91, at 46 n.166. Articles 5(3) and 5(4) of the Berne
Convention read:
(3) Protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic law.
However, when the author is not a national of the country of origin of the
work for which he is protected under this Convention, he shall enjoy in that
country the same rights as national authors.
(4) The country of origin shall be considered to be:
(a) in the case of works first published in a country of the Union, that
country; in the case of works published simultaneously in several countries
of the Union which grant different terms of protection, the country whose
legislation grants the shortest term of protection;
(b) in the case of works published simultaneously in a country outside the
Union and in a country of the Union, the latter country;
(c) in the case of unpublished works or of works first published in a country
outside the Union, without simultaneous publication in a country of the
Union, the country of the Union of which the author is a national, provided
that:
(i) when these are cinematographic works the maker of which has his
headquarters or his habitual residence in a country of the Union, the
country of origin shall be that country, and
(ii) when these are works of architecture erected in a country of the Union
or other artistic works incorporated in a building or other structure located
in a country of the Union, the country of origin shall be that country.
284. See Art. 5(1) BC ("[I]n countries of the Union other than the country of origin");
Ricketson, supra note 58, at 5.81; Masouy6, supra note 137, at 5.6; von Lewinski, supra
note 76, at 5 n.13. This is the reason why 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) limits registration as a
condition to instituting an infringement action to "United States works." See Goldstein,
supra note 69, at § 3.15.
285. See Ricketson, supra note 58, at 5.81 (explaining that the convention invariably
has a decisive effect on the content of the domestic laws of its members).
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If the opt-out model is not in line with international copyright
law and admissible modifications of this concept do not seem
reasonable as to their consequences, consideration should be given to
the legal and practical aspects of an opt-in model.
3. Opting In to the Levy/Tax System
a. Features and Benefits
To get paid a share of the levy/tax based on the monitored use of
the work in p2p file-sharing systems according to the opt-out model,
the right holder has to register her work with the competent
authority. As long as the work has not been registered and
technologically tagged, the use will be unauthorized and thus will
infringe the author's rights.286 This means that exclusivity is the legal
default-just as it is today. The levy/tax system would provide an
additional business model, available for those right holders who think
that this mode of exploitation is more attractive than individual
licensing on the basis of DRM.
Obviously, this solution does not raise doubts as to whether it is
in accordance with treaty obligations under Berne, TRIPS or the
WCT. It does not limit the enjoyment or exercise of exclusive rights
by law. Moreover, these rights come into existence without
formalities or other conditions. Accordingly, neither the guarantee of
normal exploitation under the three-step test 287 nor the prohibition of
formalities is affected. This concept only gives the copyright owner an
incentive to accept lawful non-commercial file sharing by providing a
distribution channel where "compensation without control" can
become reality.
The questions relating to this approach are-contrary to the opt-
out model-not of a positivistic and legal, but of a practical nature: is
it persuasive to implement a levy or tax on devices and services up
front if it is still up to the right holder to reserve "all" rights or only
"some"? Additionally, how is this different from a voluntary
286. For a different proposed solution, see Fisher, supra note 1, at 204 (If the work is
not registered, it would be deemed to be dedicated to the public domain: "[wiould each
creator be obliged to register his or her creations? No. Unlike cars, songs and films could be
unlicensed. Creators who wished for whatever reason to dedicate their products to the
public domain could do so.").
287. Still, however, the first and third requirements of the three-step test have to be
observed. See supra Part IV.B.
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collective licensing scheme as proposed inter alia by the EFF if the
right holder is free to choose exclusivity?'
b, The Opt-In Model Compared to Collective Licensing
The difference and at the same time the advantage that makes
the opt-in model more attractive than voluntary collective licensing
relates to the funding of the system and the way lawful uses are
compensated.Collective licensing relies on a voluntary agreement of
right holders to form a collecting society, which then offers consumers
the opportunity to use works online in exchange for a regular
payment. This system will function successfully only under the
condition that most if not all works are covered. Otherwise,
consumers have no incentive to pay a subscription fee if they are not
offered a variety of content. If it is not certain that enough users will
subscribe, right holders have no incentive to agree on collective
licensing instead of exploiting their works individually in different
commercial online ventures while trying to stop unauthorized file
sharing in p2p networks. This may be the reason voluntary collective
licensing has not been adopted in the digital network environment. 9
A levy/tax system provides funds to be distributed among right
holders without requiring them to establish a collective society and
without relying on the readiness of consumers to pay a subscription
fee. Instead, the levy/tax is imposed upfront on services and products
whose value is increased by file sharing.2 9° Thereby, a significant
amount of money will be collected. All right holders who register
their works are entitled to a share of this revenue. The primary
difference between a levy/tax system and collective licensing is that a
levy/tax system generates funding as an incentive for choosing
"sharing" instead of "hoarding., 291 With registration, the work
288. See supra Part Ill.B; EFF, supra note 50 (for the EFF proposal).
289. See supra Part V.A; Fisher, supra note 1, at 257-58.
290. See Netanel, supra note 48, at 35-59. The levy/tax would have to be imposed on all
services and products offered in the respective country. It therefore would not severely
affect competition in the relevant markets because any manufacturer or supplier of
services would have to pay the levy/tax. It must be admitted, though, that newly developed
substitutes would have to be covered quickly.
291. The PotatoSystem relies on a different incentive. It is based on a commission
model that gives users who pay for the download of a music file the right to redistribute
this work. The consumer can thus make money if other users acquire the music file from
her. With the prospect of making money by redistributing works on the net, more and
more users have an incentive to enter the system and to pay for the music and the right of
redistribution in the first place. In the end, every user would act as a commercial
distributor. Downloads from websites and file sharing would be transformed from
uncompensated uses to "regular" market transactions. See PotatoSystem, supra note 225.
A BIPOLAR COPYRIGHT SYSTEM
becomes available for lawful non-commercial file sharing. This, in
turn, increases the readiness of consumers to pay more for Internet
access or devices used for file sharing. In other words, the
government would step in to offer an incentive for copyright owners
to accept "compensation without control." This is necessary because
"contracting into liability rules"2"" obviously does not take place
automatically. The government, however, does not force right holders
into liability rules, since that would be incompatible with
international copyright law. Instead, it establishes a system for
indirect compensation of non-commercial file sharing. Whereas in the
short run, not all works will be available for lawful file sharing, the
fact that at least some will be available will probably change
consumers' attitudes towards the way works on the Internet can be
legally accessed. This "soft" pressure and change of consumer
behavior is likely to make the levy/tax system ever more appealing for
copyright owners.
The fact that the levy/tax system may grow due to network
effects, however, also reveals important drawbacks of the opt-in
model. The levy or tax has to be imposed without the prospect that all
works will be lawfully available in p2p networks. Especially works
that promise commercial success will, at least in the beginning, not
likely be registered. Thus, the ones who have to pay the levy/tax, i.e.,
consumers and manufacturers of devices and suppliers of services
used for file sharing, will claim that they are burdened whereas it is
uncertain how much the public will gain from the system. In fact, this
value judgment will be at the core of the political discussion
surrounding an opt-in model: is it justified to raise prices for devices
and services at the heart of the information and knowledge society in
order to establish an additional business model for the distribution of
copyrighted content online?
Since right holders retain their freedom to decide about the use
of their work, it will instead be manufacturers of devices and suppliers
of services who will primarily defy the implementation of this
proposal.293 The opt-in model shifts the pressure away from copyright
292. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293
(1996) (explaining why right holders will automatically establish systems like collective
licensing if individual licensing does not work).
293. Fisher, supra note 1, at 242. This repudiation can also be observed in the course of
the discussion about the future of the limitation and the levy for private copying in
Germany. See, e.g., Bernd Rohleder, Fur eine zukunfisfahige Urhebervergiitung,
Zeitschrift fur Urheber- und Medienrecht (ZUM) 1061 (2004) (proposing to abolish the
levy for digital private copies).
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owners towards a party that neither creates nor consumes content.
This view, however, neglects the fact that manufacturers and
suppliers of services profit from unauthorized use of copyrighted
works in p2p networks because they commercialize the very services
and devices necessary for file sharing. Thus, they cannot claim that
they're not involved.
In summary, there are many good reasons for a bipolar opt-in
model, even if it is uncertain how many works will in the end be
lawfully available for non-commercial file sharing. Most important, it
is the only model that brings a levy/tax system in the digital network
environment in line with international copyright law.
c. Further Questions
The primary aim of this article is to test the flexibility of
international copyright law in light of proposals for a levy/tax system
covering non-commercial file sharing. It is not meant to address the
manifold questions related to the implementation of such a system. It
will not discuss, for example, which classes of works shall be
covered,294 who is the responsible right holder to make the choice
between "sharing" or "hoarding, 29 how much funding is needed to
compensate the copyright owners, or which services and devices are
294. Not surprisingly, many proposals that gave rise to this study focus on music on the
Internet because it still is mostly music that is shared. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 91, at 2;
Gervais, supra note 50; Shih Ray Ku, supra note 79, at 567; Sobel, supra note 55, at 694
However, according to a recent study, the sharing of video, images, and software are
surging. See Howe, supra note 10. Neil Netanel would apply his Non-Commercial Use
Levy to movies, music, text, and graphics, but not to computer programs. Netanel, supra
note 48, at 41. William Fisher limits his proposal to audio and video recordings. Fisher,
supra note 1, at 10. Peter Eckersley claims that his "virtual market system" might be a
normatively superior means for providing incentives to produce digital writing (e-books,
websites), music, and film. Eckersley, supra note 28, at 112. Daniel Gervais proposes a
default license for sharing music, but not for text and images. Gervais, supra note 11, at 70.
295. This question was raised by P. Bernt Hugenholtz during the ATRIP 2004
conference in Utrecht. It relates to the fact that a music or video recording comprises
several different copyrightable subject matters or-in European legal terminology-
copyrights and neighbouring rights. Under U.S. copyright law, a music file, for example,
can be subject to a copyright in the musical composition, in the words of the song, and in
the sound recording. Not all copyrights have to be owned by the same person or entity. See
Leaffer, supra note 65, at § 3.19; Fisher, supra note 1, at 204. The question then arises: who
is entitled to decide how the music file may be used in cyberspace? The answer is that it is
the person who holds the right to make the music file available and to reproduce it in the
respective country. As regards music, as a rule, a record company-if not the author of a
work made for hire-acquires all rights necessary from the original authors. Thus, one
should ask: Who is the person holding all rights necessary to authorize non-commercial
file sharing in the U.S. or the EC? This is also the way to identify the "right holder" under
Art. 6 EC Copyright Directive. See Copyright Directive, supra note 59; Peukert, supra
note 195, at § 34 no. 13-14.
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subject to the levy/tax etc.296 These issues largely are beyond the
positivistic approach of this article. However, some additional
remarks on how the bipolar opt-in model would work are worth
considering.
First, would a copyright owner be barred from employing DRM
after registering the work with the competent authority to become
eligible for the levy/tax system? Although it might seem odd at first
glance, the answer should be in the negative.297 In this context,
international copyright law is not the reason. Clearly, if the right
holder voluntarily chooses to accept non-commercial file sharing, it is
up to the national legislature to regulate the consequences of this
decision. International copyright law contains no specifications as to a
levy/tax system as a secondary alternative to exclusive exploitation in
cyberspace. The reason the copyright owner should still be free to
grant individual licenses for commercial online ventures like iTunes,
etc., is that the levy/tax system only privilege and covers non-
commercial uses. As regards commercial online exploitation of the
work, the right holder retains her exclusive rights. Additionally, some
right holders may be less reluctant to register their work if they are
still free to offer their works in commercial online ventures. Those
services may still attract consumers if they are easier to use and offer
additional features (merchandising products, etc.) not available in p2p
networks. At the same time, the work is lawfully available in p2p
networks so that the public can take advantage of the levy/tax system.
Consumers should, however, be enabled to easily inform themselves
about the availability of a certain work in the levy/tax system. In this
respect, one can think of a searchable database or even some kind of
automatically displayed tag which signals that the respective work
may be shared lawfully. Moreover, there is no risk of double
compensation in the sense that the author receives shares of the
levy/tax and additionally generates income from licensing the work to
commercial online ventures.2" The reason is that the author's share of
the levy/tax depends on the actual uses of the work in p2p networks
as automatically monitored.299 If commercial offers are so attractive
that users refrain from file sharing, the author's interest in the
levy/tax will decrease accordingly. Note that this competition between
296. For a discussion on the last two points, see Netanel, supra note 48, at 43 et seq.;
Fisher, supra note 1, at 205-223; Eckersley, supra note 28, at 106.
297. See also Fisher, supra note 1, at 248.
298. For a discussion of double compensation with regard to the levy for digital private
copying under European copyright law, see supra Part IV.D.
299. See supra Part III.B.
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p2p networks and commercial online ventures is made possible
because the copyright owner accepts that her work be "shared." If the
law established this competition under a non-voluntary license, this
would amount to a violation of the three-step test (conflict with
normal exploitation). 30° Again, copyright law should not limit the
variety of ways works can be distributed and exploited, but should
offer as many business models as possible. The choice is then up to
the rightholder in each individual case.
Second, copyright owners may hesitate to register their works for
the levy/tax system because control over the work is deemed to be
"lost" forever if it is ever available for lawful, technologically
unprotected file sharing. In this respect, it has already been shown
that a withdrawal of a registered work from the levy/tax system can
be of interest to right holders.3°' To make this a viable option, the
legal and technological architecture of the bipolar copyright system
would have to address two main concerns. First, a withdrawal of the
work has to be visible to the consumer. This may be accomplished by
an online database or-eyen better-by an automatic indexing system
indicating the status of a work (a green or red flag). Thus, consumers
do not risk sharing works which initially were available, but were later
retracted. Additionally, one might contemplate a grace period of
perhaps six months until the withdrawal becomes effective. Second,
the copyright owner must be in a position to enforce her regained
exclusive rights against non-commercial file sharing. Since the files
are not incorporated into an overall DRM system, their use cannot be
stopped technologically. One therefore has to rely on legal
enforcement. In that regard, a streamlined enforcement mechanism
like the one proposed by Lemley and Reese would be a reasonable
approach. It could be part of the necessary amendments of current
law to establish the bipolar opt-in copyright system.
Finally, the foregoing assessments rest upon the assumption that
every copyright owner will actually make a decision about whether to
go for the levy/tax share or for proprietary exploitation. This,
however, is not a very realistic view. Many right holders will not even
take notice of this option because they do not attend to the work or
are not even aware of the fact that they own copyrights, for example
in the case of heirs. As a result, only a fraction of even those works
the system specifically aims at, i.e., works not (any more)
300. See supra Part IV.B.2.
301. See supra Part V.B.2.b.
302. Lemley & Reese, supra note 38, at 1424.
commercialized, will be registered. Two consequences arise out of
this circumstance. One is that only those right holders who register
their work will be entitled to a share of the levy/tax. This, however, is
only a necessary side effect of the autonomy of the right holder.
Those who do not concern themselves with their works simply cannot
expect the copyright system to automatically step in.
The second effect of a right holder's ignorance towards the
bipolar opt-in system is more problematic. It particularly concerns old
works still under copyright. Under the opt-out model, these works
could be lawfully shared in p2p networks because the levy/tax system
would be the statutory default rule. According to the opt-in model,
these works remain under exclusive control of the copyright owner
because here exclusivity is the default. Thus, even if the right holder
never objects to these uses, they are clearly copyright infringements
because they are not approved through registration. As the discussion
of the opt-out model already revealed, national copyright law that
declares those uses lawful unless the copyright owner expressly
objects is not in line with international copyright law.3 3 Accordingly,
with regard to a work about which no choice is made, the situation
would stay the way it is today. File sharing would be infringement, but
copyright would not be enforced in practice. Clearly, this is a serious
drawback of the opt-in model dictated by international copyright law.
In order to give right holders an incentive not only to register but first
of all to make their decision, copyright law should not award statutory
damages and attorney's fees for any infringement of copyright unless
the right holder notifies the competent authority that she does not
want her work to be shared in p2p networks.3" One could additionally
think about limiting the streamlined enforcement system as proposed
by Lemley and Reese 5 to this category of works.
303. See supra Part V.B.2.b.
304. This proposal is modeled on 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) (2000), which reads:
In any action under this title, other than an action brought for a violation of
the rights of the author under section 106A (a) or an action instituted
under section 411 (b), no award of statutory damages or of attorney's fees,
as provided by sections 504 and 505, shall be made for ... (2) any
infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the work
and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration is
made within three months after the first publication of the work.
For the background of this provision and its relationship to obligations under the Berne
Convention, see Goldstein, supra note 69, at § 3.15. To deny the copyright owner an award
of attorney's fees is not an option for jurisdictions where the party defeated in the action is
generally required to pay the costs of the proceedings. This is the case, for example, under
German law. See Sec. 91 German Code of Civil Procedure.
305. Lemley & Reese, supra note 38.
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C. International Dimension
One additional aspect of the bipolar copyright system that has
not been studied intensively is the international dimension of such a
system.The bipolar copyright system is geared towards the digital
online environment. The Internet and p2p networks reach all over the
world, and are not confined to a specific country. It is therefore
essential to consider the international context in which p2p file
sharing takes place. A proposal addressing the Internet that assumes
that all parties and actions involved are located in one single country
falls far short of the reality it applies to. For a long time, this friction
between global networks and national legislation in over 180
countries has been identified as one of the core problems of the
regulation of "cyberspace."'' It also would affect the bipolar
copyright system.
If this system were established in only one country, for example
the U.S., only consumers in that country would have to pay higher
prices for services and devices used for file sharing.0 7 At the same
time, only up- and downloads occurring in the U.S. would be
privileged under the levy/tax system because national copyright law
applies only to those uses taking place in the respective country.8
Consequently, if a p2p network user downloads a work in a country
outside the U.S., she may well infringe the copyright existing in the
work under the law of that country even though the work is registered
and lawfully available for noncommercial file sharing in the U.S.
Theoretically, the copyright owner would be able to enforce her
exclusive rights abroad and to opt for the levy/tax system in the U.S.3
Practically, however, this distinction will hardly ever be important. If
a right holder accepts file sharing in exchange for participating in the
levy/tax distribution in one country, she will not likely try to prohibit
306. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199
(1998); David G. Post, Against "Against Cyberanarchy," 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365
(2002); Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA
LAW & TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL (UOLTJ) 213 (2003-2004).
307. Fisher, supra note 1, at 245 (acknowledging the leakage of a national tax-funded
system across national borders).
308. This lex loci protectionis as to the rights and their limitations seems to be accepted
in nearly all jurisdictions. For U.S. law, see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 73 S. Ct. 921 (1953); Itar-
Tass v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1998). For German law, see the
decisions (English translations) of the Federal Supreme Court, 24 IIC 539, 540 (1993); 30
IIC 227, 230 (1999). See generally William Patry, Choice of Law and International
Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383 (2000).
309. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss possible solutions under choice of
law provisions.
the very same behavior in other countries. Registration in one
country will likely mean that users in other countries enjoy virtually
the same privileges as consumers in the country where the bipolar
system is in place. The only-though major-difference is that
consumers abroad would not have to pay for non-commercial file
sharing. It should therefore be acknowledged that cross-subsidization
would occur not only in the U.S. (between high-level users of p2p file-
sharing networks and those who pay the levy/tax but do not up- or
download copy-protected content),31° but also between jurisdictions
that implement the bipolar copyright system and those that do not.
Nevertheless, these negative effects should not lead to a
complete rejection of the bipolar copyright system. Seen from the
perspective of the copyright owners, they are still free to choose
between exclusivity and the levy/tax system. They simply have to
decide which system is more promising. In doing so, they have to take
into account the international dimension of their choice. Obviously,
the more countries participating and the higher the prospective
revenue for each individual author is, the more works are likely to be
released into the levy/tax system. The phenomenon of international
cross-subsidization again brings up the core question of the bipolar
copyright system, i.e., whether a society wants to spend more on
devices and services related to the Internet in order to provide for an
indirect funding for authors and the content they create. Still, one
country could make the first step without needing the approval of all
other contracting parties of Berne, TRIPS and the WCT.
Alternatively, the bipolar copyright system could be established
in those countries where most of the p2p file-sharing activity takes
place. According to a recent study,311 the EC (45 percent3'2) and the
U.S. (36 percent) alone make up 81percent of the file trading. If one
embraces three more countries 33 even 92 percent of the traffic would
be covered. Therefore, agreement between these contracting parties
to international copyright treaties314 would minimize the effects of
international cross-subsidization. If p2p use becomes more
widespread in other countries due to increased proliferation of
310. See Netanel, supra note 48, at 67.
311. See Howe, supra note 10; OECD, supra note 3, at 5-7.
312. See Howe, supra note 10 (stating the percentage of file-sharing activity as follows:
Germany 14%, Italy 10%, Poland 7%, France 7%, Spain 3%, UK 4%).
313. See id. (stating the percentage of file-sharing activity as follows: Canada 6%,
Japan 3%, Australia 2%).
314. The EC is contracting party to TRIPS and the WCT, but not to the Berne
Convention.
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Internet access, these countries could implement systems similar to
the ones already in place. This bottom-up approach differs from the
recent history of copyright law where new technologies were
regulated on an international level first without being known in any
national jurisdiction.3"' This new approach helps to avoid erroneous
solutions due to a lack of experience. Moreover, every country retains
the freedom to amend its national law if some decision proves wrong,
without having to persuade all other contracting parties to an
international treaty to do the same. Thus, a bottom-up approach
fosters flexibility in copyright legislation. Even taking into account
that the copyright owner is obliged to register her work with several
competent authorities who each handle the bipolar opt-in model in
one country only, this viewpoint has one pivotal advantage over the
alternative to establish an international consensus or to set up a
global agency for the realization of the system: it can be adopted
immediately if only one country decides to do so.
VI. Conclusion
As long as p2p file-sharing technology is not declared illegal"6
and is not substituted by other technologies, it will likely be here to
stay. If copyright owners fail to integrate this technology into business
models to generate revenue from the consumer's use of copyrighted
works (as in the case of the VCR317), the discussion about alternatives
to exclusive exploitation in cyberspace will become ever more
important. Proposals for tax or levy systems covering non-commercial
file sharing are among the most promising approaches to take
advantage of this technology for authors and society at large because
this model secures compensation for authors without hindering p2p
networks and the innovation that this technology brings about:
compensation without control.1 8
This article has shown, however, that none of the currently
discussed models is in accordance with obligations contained in
international copyright law. The BC, TRIPS and WCT rest upon the
notion of legal and technological exclusivity enjoyed by the copyright
owner. They are opposed to the implementation of statutory, non-
315. This is the case for the legal protection of technological measures against
circumvention according to Art. 11, 12, 18, 19 WCT.
316. For the limited holding of MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764
(2005), see supra Part II.A.
317. See Lessig, supra note 57, at 195; Shih Ray Ku, supra note 79, at 553-57.
318. Lessig, supra note 57, at 201.
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voluntary licenses covering noncommercial file sharing. Only if the
right holder is free to decide whether she wants her work to be
subject to a levy/tax system is exclusivity as the fundamental
requirement of international copyright law accomplished. Moreover,
exclusive rights and individual licensing have to be the legal default.
Therefore, only an opt-in model, in which the right holder has to
register the work for the levy/tax system, can be implemented in
national law without the need to amend international copyright
treaties or terminate membership.
Although this approach has some significant drawbacks,
especially with regard to the number of works available for lawful
sharing, it nevertheless provides a business model not available today,
i.e., to accept file sharing in exchange for an indirect compensation. It
is also superior to voluntary collective licensing in that it generates
funding up front and thereby gives copyright owners an incentive to
opt for "sharing." In sum, the bipolar opt-in copyright system caters
to a permanent coexistence of-speaking in economic terms-
property and liability rules in cyberspace. Whereas the architecture of
proprietary exploitation is constructed by the copyright owner, the
levy/tax system has to be established by the government. Neither
form of exploitation is outlawed.319 Instead, the choice between the
two is up to the copyright owner. Thereby, this approach enhances
freedom and triggers competition between the two alternatives for
the exploitation of works in the digital network environment. All in
all, it supports creative pursuits through exclusive rights and
innovation in and development of new communication
technologies.20
This article ultimately demonstrates that, in thinking about new
approaches, existing copyright law has to be considered because it is
to a large extent rooted in international law, which in turn is binding
upon national and even supranational legislatures (like the EC). It
further shows that it is necessary to carefully examine the drawbacks
of international harmonization as regards the flexibility of copyright
319. See also Einhorn & Rosenblatt, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 239, 271 (2005)
("In other words, P2P and DRM technologies should be left to evolve together .... ).
320. These were the two seemingly opposing policy considerations at the heart of the
Grokster decision. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2775 (2005)
("The more artistic protection is favored, the more technological innovation may be
discouraged...."); id. at 2776 n.8 ("The mutual exclusivity of these values should not be
overstated, however."); see also id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (referring to the need
for the law to "strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for
effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of
others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.").
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legislation."' This is true for both developing32 2 and industrialized
countries. The reason is that copyright in general is directly linked to
and has always reacted to technological changes. Accepting this
insight, modern national copyright laws provide for expiration dates
of certain provisions, for specific measures to quickly amend the
law,324 or at least for obligatory, regular reports on the effects of the
law.325 Even if one does not call into question the international
harmonization of copyright law in general,326 it is necessary to discuss
whether and how we can achieve a balance between the need for
adequate minimum protection on a global scale and flexibility to react
to perhaps fundamental changes in the way works are exploited and
used. 7 This call for flexibility in international copyright law not only
relates to technology-specific rules-like those on technological
protection measures-but also to the three-step test as an open,
technology-neutral and central aspect of international intellectual
property law. 28 A narrow construction of the three-step test may
prevent the implementation of a concept like the levy/tax system that
addresses new problems (file sharing) in a way that favors most if not
all parties involved. If reality proves even the initial point of a given
concept wrong, it has to be possible to modify this concept as a
whole.329
321. See generally Annette Kur, A New Framework for Intellectual Property Rights-
Horizontal Issues, 35 IIC 1, 20 (2004); contra Sirinelli, supra note 20, at 26-27 (pleading for
additional harmonization); Reinbothe & von Lewinski, supra note 70, at Art. 10 WCT no.
11 (recognizing the need to flexibly interpret the three-step test in light of changing
market conditions, focusing, however, solely on strengthening the position of authors);
Goldstein, supra note 90, at 209-11.
322. See the preamble of TRIPS: "Recognizing also the special needs of the least-
developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic
implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and
viable technological base."
323. See 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(1), (e) (2000 & Supp. II 2002); Sec. 52a, 137k German CA
(proclaiming that one limitation to copyright-Sec. 52a German CA-expires on Jan. 1, 2007).
324. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(B)-(D) (2000) (rulemaking of U.S. Copyright Office regarding
certain classes of works are exempted from the legal protection of technological measures).
325. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(5) (2000); Copyright Directive, supra note 59, at Art. 12
(both concerning the legal protection of technological measures).
326. See Kur, supra note 321, at 20 (naming soft law and recommendations as an
alternative).
327. This applies even to the proposals discussed herein. These may become obsolete,
just like today's file sharing, because of easier Internet access which enables information
of commercial databases to be streamed. See Lessig, supra note 3, at 300-04.
328. Ficsor, supra note 71, at 5.50; Senftleben. supra note 63, at 304-11.
329. But see Senftleben, supra note 63, at 304 (arguing the three-step test lends sufficient
weight to the interests of authors and users alike and it was wise to embrace the three-step test
to circumscribe the ambit of operation of permissible limitations in the digital environment).
